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III. ABSTRACT 
 
This research refers to section HK11 in the Income Tax Act 2004 (―ITA04‖). At the 
commencement of this research the New Zealand Income Tax Act was undergoing its 
final phase of a rewrite programme. The ITA04 is now Income Tax 2007, HK11
2
 is now 
HD15
3
 and the sections name ―liability for tax payable by company left with 
insufficient assets‖ is now ―asset stripping of company‖. Apart from these changes the 
actual wording of the section remains the same. The Income Tax Act 2007 came into 
effect on 1 April 2008. 
 
The Commissioner of Inland Revenue (―CIR‖) has the power to recover income 
tax owed by a company, directly from the company‘s directors and shareholders. This is 
achieved by invoking section HK11
4
. However, for this section to be successfully 
invoked the CIR must prove that the company‘s directors and/or shareholders entered 
into an arrangement with intent to deplete the company‘s assets thereby leaving it 
unable to fully satisfy its tax liabilities.  
 
This problem or mischief, commonly referred to as ―asset stripping‖, has been a 
long-standing conundrum for administrators, both domestically and internationally. 
However, overseas jurisdictions refer to this problem as ‗phoenixing‘. Phoenix 
behaviour is an invalid transfer of assets to the detriment of creditors. Although this 
appears similar to asset stripping, it is not.  
 
Asset stripping is defined
5
 as: 
 
The practice of taking over a failing company at a low price and then selling 
the assets piecemeal before closing the company down.  
 
A more common overseas reference of asset stripping is:  
 
The process of buying an undervalued company with the intent to sell off its 
assets for a profit
6
  
 
                                                 
2
 Income Tax Act 2004 
3
 Income Tax Act 2007 
4
 Income Tax Act 2004 
5
 Collins English Dictionary Complete & Unabridged, New Edition 
6
 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/assetstripping.asp 
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But, this is not what is intended by section HK11
7
. The distinction in the New 
Zealand ITA04 is that although the behaviour involves disposing of company assets the 
focus is not on its profit but its inability thereafter to meet its tax obligations as a result 
of that transaction. Considering that the assets were deliberately depleted or removed, it 
is unlikely that the company will be able to meet its tax obligations. 
 
A closer look at the problem however, shows that the benefit offered by the 
―corporate veil‖ or "limited liability‖ of companies provides certain taxpayers with the 
incentive for this abuse. The CIR is therefore faced with a dilemma. The CIR is 
statutorily bound for the care and management of the tax system. In order for the CIR to 
ensure the robustness of the tax system he has to maintain its integrity. The strategy 
adopted by the CIR to achieve this is to encourage voluntary compliance. The CIR uses 
a compliance triangle model to match a taxpayer‘s behaviour with the best remedy. 
 
Those who do not comply with their tax obligations are brought to account in an 
appropriate manner. The CIR needs to achieve this because if people see certain 
taxpayers being able to escape their tax obligations, the tax system will be undermined 
and also seen as unfair.  The CIR‘s dilemma is that he cannot ignore this problem. The 
CIR needs to reflect on: 
 The optimal remedies available to target this problem/mischief? 
 The most effective and efficient remedy to deter such behaviour? 
 How well does this remedy stack up against international best practice? 
 
In order for the CIR to have direct access to the person (s) behind this 
mischief/problem, legislators have armed the CIR with section HK11
8
. The problems 
with section HK 11
9
 are: 
 It is entirely unsettled law i.e. there is no successful case on its 
application.  
 Is it a tax recovery or tax assessment provision?  
 Do taxpayers challenge its use against them via judicial review or the 
disputes process?  
 
                                                 
7
 Income Tax Act 2004 
8
 Ibid 
9
 Ibid 
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But there are other remedies available to the CIR as well. The CIR is not bound 
to only rely on remedies available under tax legislation. The CIR being a creditor (even 
though an involuntary one), can make use of remedies available under other legislations 
– for example: 
 The Companies Act 1993 
 The Fair Trading Act 1986 
 The Commerce Act 1986 
 
The CIR may also consider invoking common law remedies – for example the 
remedy of ―tracing and constructive trust‖ to follow assets which have been squirreled 
out of ailing taxpayer companies. 
 
The CIR is a major unsecured creditor in many liquidations and sometimes is the 
only major unpaid creditor. Yet there is little written about the CIR‘s status as creditor 
of an insolvent company. This however is consistent with the lack of recovery action in 
these types of cases by the CIR. If there were more cases where the CIR was seeking to 
enforce his statutory rights either under the Companies Act 1993 or ITA04, it would 
enhance the body of knowledge in this area. 
 
There is also an argument that HK 11
10
 is a ―revenue remedy‖ (i.e. within the 
Revenue legislation) whereas non-revenue remedies such as reckless trading are not 
within the Revenue Acts hence the reluctance of the latter by the CIR to apply non-
revenue remedies. But this is not borne out by the facts. The CIR has never been 
inhibited with using the various provisions of the Companies Act 1993 to pursue unpaid 
tax liabilities.  
 
I respectfully submit that this argument is unsound as clearly the CIR makes 
regular use of non-revenue remedies and is indeed required to do so – consider the 
prevalence of utilisation of such remedies and non-revenue law as, for example 
liquidation, statutory demands, the Crimes Act, District Courts Act, High Court Rules, 
Summary Proceedings Act, Serious Fraud Office legislation, etc.  
 
Einstein once remarked that the very definition of insanity is ―to do the same 
things whilst expecting different results‖. This dissertation is focussed on the need for 
                                                 
10
 Ibid 
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reform. The type of mindset which has created or allowed the widespread abuse of 
corporate entities and complex tax structures cannot deliver the CIR from his valley of 
troubles. This mischief requires a new approach of responding to such wilfully non-
compliant taxpayers. 
 
The view that the CIR ought to confine himself to the Revenue Acts, or 
automatically prefer remedies within the revenue acts is both unsound and short-
sighted. The Companies Act is of pivotal importance and relevance to the CIR when 
dealing with corporate taxpayers. There is, in my view, no good argument against using 
non-revenue remedies (e.g. remedies within the Companies Act) when recovering debts 
from companies and delinquent directors. 
 
The CIR ought to apply the law and legal remedies which are deemed to be most 
effective and appropriate in the circumstances of each case. A good reason for the CIR 
to use an alternate remedy is that alternative remedies might be based on more settled 
law compared to the jurisprudentially troubled section HK11
11
. An example of a remedy 
which has more settled law in New Zealand jurisprudence is reckless trading under 
section 135.
12
  The advantage of using this remedy was stated by Professor Gower at 
page 115
13
: 
 
―…in practice this section represents a potent weapon in the hands of 
creditors which exercises a restraining influence on over-sanguine directors. 
The mere threat of proceedings under it has been known to result in the 
directors agreeing to make themselves personally liable for part of the 
company‘s debt. Of all the exceptions to the rule…it is probably the most 
serious attempt which has yet been made to protect creditors generally…from 
the abuses inherent in the rigid application of the corporate entity concept.‖  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 Ibid 
12
 Companies Act 1993 
13
 Gower, The Principles of Modern Company Law (4
th
 Edition) 
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IV. INTRODUCTION 
 
This research explores the application of section HK11
14
 which is a provision that 
imposes liability on a company‘s participants (directors/shareholders) for tax payable by 
a company left with insufficient assets. Although the focus is an analysis on how the 
provision may be successful, it also seeks to understand why it is necessary for the CIR 
to have a statutory provision that ignores the separate legal personality of a company. 
 
When it comes to interpreting tax legislation the courts do not approach the 
ITA04 with an assumption that the statute has an overall purpose to maximise tax. 
People who are accustomed to the doctrine of sovereignty of parliament will agree that 
the courts must interpret all statutes according to its true intent, meaning and spirit. But, 
the true intent, meaning and spirit of tax legislation is to collect tax. The courts 
however, seem to find this conclusion unappealing.  
 
The general purpose of section HK11
15
 allows the CIR to recover tax debt from 
directors and shareholders of a company that has entered into an arrangement or 
transaction to deplete the company‘s assets thereby leaving the company unable to meet 
its tax obligations. The Revenue legislation has also made accommodation for an 
equivalent provision in the Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 (―GSTA‖). This provision 
is section 61
16
.  
 
However, before the CIR invokes section HK11
17
 as a recovery remedy certain 
specific requirements must be fulfilled.  The major part of this research analyses these 
requirements. The reason for this in-depth analysis is that there has been inadequate 
judicial consideration on the correct interpretation and application of section HK11
18
. 
This inadequacy leaves the CIR and its legal advisors in a void/vacuum of legal 
uncertainty. Before considering section HK11
19
 it must be noted that an important initial 
consideration is whether the directors/shareholders have the means to pay the tax 
liability, otherwise there may be little point in pursuing the action. 
 
                                                 
14
 Income Tax Act 2004 
15
 Ibid 
16
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 
17
 Income Tax Act 2004 
18
 Ibid 
19
 Ibid 
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The challenge in this research was the lack of judicial guidance on the 
interpretation and application of section HK11
20
. Why is it that there is so little or no 
cases on the application of section HK11
21
? One possibility is that the CIR is reluctant 
to use this provision because it is too difficult to apply. It is difficult for the plaintiff to 
rely on a legal remedy as verbose and complex as section HK11
22
. It could also be that 
Revenue officers and courts prefer simpler remedies (e.g. garnishee orders).  
 
However, traditional methods often fail to collect outstanding tax debt due to the 
lack of funds available in an insolvent company. Section HK11
23
 therefore takes the 
process a step further by looking at the person in control of the company. It allows the 
CIR direct access to those person(s) in control of the company. If successfully invoked, 
section HK11
24
 would render directors/ shareholders liable for the insolvent company‘s 
outstanding tax debt.  
 
Tax debt is becoming increasingly difficult to collect. This is as a result of the 
person(s) in control of the company (directors/shareholders) pushing the boundaries of 
legislation. The proof in this lies in the fact that the assessment is returned but just not 
paid. In many corporate insolvency cases, tax debt was the only debt left which meant 
that the CIR was the only creditor. It must also be remembered that the CIR is an 
―involuntary statutory creditor‖. This means that the CIR cannot choose whether or not 
to deal with delinquent directors/shareholders. Unlike the Customs Authority, the CIR 
does not have possession of any assets of the debtor.  
 
The CIR cites the reason for the increase in uncollectable debt as debt collection 
becoming more complex
25
. What this means is that taxpayers are structuring their 
affairs in such a manner that recovery of the tax debt is becoming very difficult to 
collect thereby placing the revenue at risk. Complex structures involve the use of 
multiple entities (usually incorporated companies and trusts) in a structure which 
enables the taxpayer (i.e. the controlling mind) to shift assets between these entities 
thereby leaving creditors playing ―catch up‖. Companies are then liquidated without the 
                                                 
20
 Ibid 
21
 Ibid 
22
 Ibid 
23
 Ibid 
24
 Ibid 
25
 New Zealand Inland Revenue – Annual Report 2004, Part Three Improving Compliance 
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means to pay the tax debt and the person(s) in control of those liquidated companies 
then incorporate other entities and repeat this pattern of behaviour with new companies.   
 
This suggests that the initial company though insolvent had resources which 
were transferred by some means to the successor company. A unique feature of these 
person(s), as previously mentioned, is that they tend to flout the law which governs the 
use of these entities. For example, such taxpayers on the road to insolvency and failure 
make unlawful distributions to shareholders.
26
 Some might call this entrepreneurship yet 
if this involved a tax assessment then one would say it is tax avoidance and possibly 
evasion. Section HK11
27
 with its intended effect is therefore a guardian provision of 
similar centrality to that of section BG1
28
.   
 
Part V looks at the history and purpose of section HK11
29
. This is so that we can 
better understand the reason for having this section as part of our tax legislation. It will 
also help us later on to make recommendations for reform if need be (and I conclude 
that reform is indeed necessary). This section is also linked to tax and the corporate veil 
which explores what the courts have said about these two concepts.  Part VI is an in-
depth analysis of each specific requirement under section HK11
30
. The approach 
adopted in this section is to predict how the courts might interpret the application of 
each specific requirement if a case went to court.   
 
Part VII looks at alternate remedies to section HK11
31
. This section investigates 
what other, already tried and tested remedies can do for the CIR and what section 
HK11
32
 is apparently failing to accomplish. Part VIII explores what other jurisdictions 
do in regard to complex debt and serious non-compliance. In particular we look at 
Australia, United Kingdom and Canada. These jurisdictions were selected because they 
are Common Law jurisdictions which offer the greatest support to New Zealand‘s tax 
cases. Part IX examines the compliance issues of our tax system, in particular the ―care 
and management‖33 duties of the CIR and the compliance model within which taxpayer 
                                                 
26
 Section 56 Companies Act 1993 
27
 Income tax Act 2004 
28
 Ibid 
29
 Ibid 
30
 Ibid 
31
 Ibid 
32
 Ibid 
33
 ―The Commissioner‟s duty to assess and collect taxes, and the various duties imposed under section 6 
and 6A of the Tax Administration Act 1994; with particular emphasis upon the ambit and scope of 
 12 
behaviour is influenced. This part concludes by offering suggestions on possible reform 
that will support the care and management duties of the CIR as well as help promote 
New Zealand‘s tax system as being both efficient and simple. 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
subsection 6A(2), by which the Commissioner is charged with the „care and management‟ of taxes 
covered by the Inland Revenue Acts‖ – INS00072[d] Care and Management of Taxes Draft Interpretation 
Statement-21 December 2005 
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V. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF SECTION HK11 
 
Since its origins, the recovery provision has been subjected to numerous modifications 
to get to its current form. The provision evolved originally from section 21
34
. This 
provision, as stated in the parliamentary speech given by Mr Walter Nash, was 
parliament‘s reaction to remedy the problem of companies being wound up leaving 
them with unpaid tax.
35
 Parliament became aware of this problem as a result of the 
liquidation of Waihi and Martha Golding Mining companies. At that time, gold mining 
companies were taxed under special tax rules. Income Tax was only levied on the 
company when the company paid dividends to its shareholders.  
 
The major concern centred on the fact that such companies, controlled by non-
residents, could declare a solitary sizeable dividend and then be wound up. This left the 
company unable to pay it‘s income tax liability. A new company could then be 
established to continue the relevant mining activities.
36
  
 
Section 21
37
 then became section 276
38
. However, this provision only covered 
―phoenix company‖ scenarios. A phoenix company has been described as: 
 
[Where a] limited liability company fails, unable to pay its debts…At the 
same time afterwards, the same business rises from the ashes with the same 
directors, under the guise of a new limited company, but disclaiming any 
responsibility for the debts of the previous company.
39
 
 
The provision deemed a new company, which is owned and controlled by the 
same persons of a former company, to be an agent of that former company for all tax 
payable. Companies within the same group are also held liable under this provision. 
 
In Instant Finance Corporation (1987) v CIR
40
 Barker J stated the policy intent 
of the provision was: 
 
                                                 
34
 Finance Act 1937 
35
 New Zealand Parliamentary debates November 2 to December 10, 1937 Col. 592 
36
 Ibid 
37
 Finance Act 1937 
38
 Income Tax Act 1976 
39
 Law Reform Committee of the Parliament of Victoria Curbing the Phoenix company; First report on 
the Law relating to Directors and Managers of Insolvent Corporations (June 1994) 
40
 [1995] 17 NZTC 12,159 
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―…to prevent a company escaping its tax liability merely by going out of 
existence where the shareholders or controllers of the original company have 
brought a new company into existence.‖  
 
A number of cases had been decided under section 276
41
. In CIR v Alistair Robb 
Ltd
42
 the CIR succeeded because the Court was satisfied that the requirements under the 
provision were met. That is, the new company had substantially the same owners and 
persons in control as the former company.  Furthermore, the Privy Council in BNZ 
Finance Ltd v Holland (CIR)
43
 stated that the provision can be applied even if the CIR 
has consented to the dissolution of the original company.  However, none of these cases 
addressed the policy intent or connection with company law, of section 276
44
. The 
majority of cases did not deal with the substantive requirements of the provision. 
Instead they dealt with the type of tax and the status of the tax assessment of the former 
company.   
 
 But, this section was deficient in a number of respects. And despite practitioners 
concerns that section 276 appeared to have extremely broad application it nevertheless 
proved ineffective against asset stripping.
45
 The Inland Revenue Department (―IRD‖) 
also identified a number of deficiencies regarding the operation of the recovery 
provision. These concerns were recognised by the Government. The Minister of Finance 
at the time, Ruth Richardson stated in the Business Tax Policy Statement on 30 July 
1991: 
―Problems with the existing recovery provision 
 
Section 276 is intended to enable the Commissioner to recover the tax 
payable by a company that has ceased to carry on a business or has been 
wound up (the ‗original company‘), from any new company set up by 
shareholders of the original company 
 
That is, it is intended to prevent schemes in which the assets of the original 
company are stripped out of the new company owned by the same 
shareholders, leaving the original company with insufficient assets to meet it 
tax liabilities 
 
"Practitioners are particularly concerned about the extremely broad 
application of the current recovery provision. Not only does it give the 
Commissioner the power to recover tax from new companies which have the 
same directors and shareholders [of the new company] as the original 
company that engaged in asset stripping, but it also enables him to recover 
                                                 
41
 Income Tax Act 1976 
42
 [1991] 13 NZTC 8,003 
43
 [1997] 18 NZTC 13,461 (PC) 
44
 Income tax Act 1976 
45
 New Zealand Income Tax Law and Practice Commentary, CCH New Zealand, Auckland 
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the outstanding tax from other companies within the same corporate group as 
that original company‖.46  
 
This means that a company in a corporate group is potentially liable for the 
outstanding tax arising from the asset stripping activities of any other company in that 
corporate group, even if they were not engaged in those activities and had little or no 
power to prevent those activities. It also means that companies that take over another 
company must be aware of any past liabilities of the company being purchased, but also 
of the past liabilities of all companies with substantially the same shareholders, 
throughout the company's entire history. In practice, many companies may find this 
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.  
 
These difficulties might arise from the fact that section 276
47
(now section 
HK11
48
) was designed to combat a specific form of mischief – i.e. that which the CIR 
experienced in connection with mining companies and their liquidation dividend. 
Apparently section 276
49
(and section HK11
50
) is not designed to effectively deal with 
any form of misuse of the privilege of limited liability. 
 
―[P]ractitioners have argued that the application of section 276 should be 
targeted at those in control of the company at the time the taxable 
transactions occurred in order to ensure that the remedy for the mischief is 
directed at those responsible for the mischief‖. 51 
 
On the 30 July 1991 the Minister of Finance stated
52
 that tax recovery section, 
formerly section 276
53
, will be replaced with section HK 11
54
, a "better targeted tax 
recovery provision‖55. 
  
The new provision, section HK11
56
, allows the CIR to recover a company‘s tax 
from its directors and shareholders. This would be the case if the directors and 
shareholders allowed the company to enter into an arrangement or transaction whereby 
                                                 
46
 Business Tax Policy 1991 at pp 103, 104 
47
 Income Tax Act 1976 
48
 Income Tax Act 2004 
49
 Income tax Act 1976 
50
 Income Tax Act 2004 
51
 Business Tax Policy 1991 at pp 104 
52
 1991 Budget  
53
 Income Tax Act 1976 
54
 Income Tax Act 1994 
55
 Income Tax Amendment Act (No 2) 1992 
56
 Income Tax Act 1994 
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the company's assets were depleted thereby resulting in the company‘s inability to fully 
meet its tax liabilities itself.  
 
The significant difference between the former section 276
57
 and the replacement 
provision is that the former provision made another related company liable for 
outstanding tax. The new provision makes directors and certain shareholders of the 
company liable for the company‘s tax liability if there are insufficient assets for the 
company to meet its tax liability itself, provided specific requirements are met. The 
replacement tax recovery provision enables the Commissioner to recover tax from those 
directors and shareholders regardless of whether they have an equity interest in another 
company.  
 
The Government stated that the new provision: 
  
―…will not be triggered by formal arrangements (under insolvency 
proceedings) or informal arrangements (under sec 414A of the Income Tax 
Act 1976) between the Commissioner of Inland Revenue, the company and 
its other creditors, which result in the Commissioner accepting less than the 
full amount of tax outstanding‖.58 
 
Unlike the former provision, which did not specify the time at which the 
companies had to be related, recovery of the outstanding tax that results from these asset 
stripping arrangements will be sought from those taxpayers that were directors and 
shareholders of the company at the time the arrangement was entered into. Directors are 
made jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the shortfall in tax that results 
from action taken to strip the company of its assets.  
 
The Government further indicated that the new provision:  
 
―…will prevent corporates who engage in imputation credit streaming and 
loss trading from evading tax and eliminating their exposure to anti-
avoidance legislation by stripping out the assets of their companies, and 
selling those companies prior to wind-up‖.59  
 
But to enable a correct assessment it was appropriate to consider the meaning of 
―tax liability‖ in section HK1160. However, the problem was that ―tax liability was not 
                                                 
57
 Income Tax Act 1976 
58
 Business Tax Policy 1991 at pp 105 
59
 Ibid 
60
 Income Tax Act 1994 
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defined in the Income Tax Act 1994 or any other section of the Act. The conundrum 
was: what was included in the tax liability? The confusion was whether tax liability 
constituted just the core tax or did it include a civil penalty or interest. 
 
This problem was rectified when The Taxation (base Maintenance and 
Miscellaneous) Bill 2004 was introduced on the 16 November 2004. The clause by 
clause analysis stated: 
 
Clause 49 amends section HK11 to ensure that director and controlling 
shareholders of a company are liable for the unpaid tax (including civil 
penalties and use of money interest) owed by the company in the 
circumstance prescribed in the section.  
 
Clause 49 was enacted as section 66 of the Taxation (Base Maintenance and 
Miscellaneous Provision) Act 2005 and came into force after the Act received Royal 
Assent on 21 June 2005. 
 
This was the last major modification to the content of section HK11
61
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61
 Income Tax Act 2004 
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VI. ANALYSIS OF SECTION HK11 
 
A. The legislation 
 
HK 11 Liability for tax payable by company left with insufficient assets 
 
HK 11(1) [Application]  
This section applies where—  
(a) any arrangement has been entered into in relation to a company; and 
(b) an effect of that arrangement is that the company is unable to satisfy under this Act a liability 
(called in this section the tax liability) of the company, whether arising before or after the 
arrangement is entered, for—  
(i) income tax: 
(ii) a civil penalty: 
(iii) an amount payable under Part 7 of the Tax Administration Act 1994; and 
(c) it can reasonably be concluded that—  
(i) a director of the company at the time of entry into the arrangement who had made all 
reasonable inquiries into the affairs of the company would have anticipated at that time that the 
tax liability would be, or would be likely to be, required to be satisfied by the company under 
this Act; and 
(ii) a purpose of the arrangement was to have the effect specified in paragraph (b).  
 
HK 11(2) [Non-application]  
This section does not apply to—  
(a) any arrangement to which the Commissioner is a party; or 
(b) any arrangement to the extent that the Commissioner is satisfied that the tax liability is less 
than or equal to any amount of income tax—  
(i) arising under this Act as a direct result of the performance of the arrangement; and 
(ii) the liability for which has been duly satisfied under this Act; or 
(c) any arrangement entered into at a time when the company is under statutory management 
under the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 or the Corporations (Investigation and 
Management) Act 1989. 
 
HK 11(3) [Liability of directors]  
Where any arrangement to which this section applies has been entered into, all persons who were 
directors of the company at the time the arrangement was entered into are, subject to subsection 
(6), jointly and severally liable for the tax liability as agent of the company.  
 
HK 11(4) [Liability of shareholders]  
Where any arrangement to which this section applies has been entered into, any person who 
was—  
(a) a controlling shareholder at the time the arrangement was entered into; or 
(b) a person who had a voting interest or market value interest in the company (calculated, in any 
case where the person is a company, as if the person were not a company) at the time the 
arrangement was entered into, where it could reasonably be concluded, having regard to the 
materiality of the benefit derived by the person from the arrangement, that the person was a party 
to the arrangement,— 
is liable as agent of the company for—  
(c) the tax liability (excluding a civil penalty or an amount payable under Part 7 of the Tax 
Administration Act 1994 that is part of the tax liability) to the extent that the amount of the tax 
liability (so exclusive) does not exceed the greater of—  
(i) the market value of the person's direct and indirect shareholding in the company at the time of 
entry into the arrangement; and 
(ii) the value of any benefit derived by the person from the arrangement; and 
(d) that proportion of a civil penalty or an amount payable under Part 7 of the Tax 
Administration Act 1994 that is part of the tax liability, which is equal to the proportion which 
the amount for which the person is liable under paragraph (c) represents as a proportion of the 
tax liability (excluding the civil penalty or the amount payable under Part 7 of the Tax 
Administration Act 1994).  
 
HK 11(5) [Limitation on liability]  
A limitation placed on the liability of any person under subsection (4) applies notwithstanding 
section HK 3(3).  
 
HK 11(6) [Circumstances where director not liable]  
Notwithstanding subsection (3), a director is not liable under that subsection for any tax liability 
of the company where the Commissioner is satisfied that the director derived no benefit from the 
arrangement and either—  
(a) the director has, at the first reasonable opportunity after becoming aware of the arrangement, 
or of those aspects of the arrangement that render it subject to this section,—  
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(i) formally recorded with the company his or her dissent in relation to the arrangement; and 
(ii) notified the Commissioner of the arrangement and of his or her dissent from that 
arrangement; or 
(b) the director satisfies the Commissioner that—  
(i) the director was not at the material time or times involved in the executive management of the 
company; and 
(ii) the director had no knowledge of the arrangement, or of those aspects of the arrangement that 
render it subject to the application of this section. 
HK 11(7) [Commissioner may issue or amend assessments after company liquidated]  
Subject to the time bar, but notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or the Tax 
Administration Act 1994, for the purposes of giving effect to this section where a company has 
been liquidated, the Commissioner may at any time after the liquidation make or amend any 
assessment of a company under this Act or an earlier Act or the Tax Administration Act 1994 in 
respect of any tax liability of the company as if the company had not been liquidated.  
 
HK 11(8) [Commissioner may nominate agent]  
Where the Commissioner makes or amends any assessment under subsection (7), the 
Commissioner must nominate 1 or more persons whom the Commissioner considers to be liable 
in respect of the tax liability specified in that assessment and that person or those persons are 
treated, for the purposes of this Act and the Inland Revenue Acts in respect of any notification or 
objection procedure in relation to that assessment or amended assessment, as the agent or agents 
of the company.  
 
HK 11(9) [Circumstances where agent not liable]  
No person is liable under this section as agent for the tax liability of a company in respect of any 
particular tax year where—  
(a) the company has furnished returns for that tax year before the expiry of the time allowed 
under section 37 of the Tax Administration Act 1994 for the furnishing of returns for the tax year 
in which the company is liquidated; and 
(b) the Commissioner fails to issue a notice of assessment of the company for the particular tax 
year before the expiry of 4 years following the end of the tax year in which the company is 
liquidated. 
 
HK 11(10) [Definitions]  
In this section,—  
controlling shareholder means, at any time at which an arrangement to which this section 
applies is entered into, in respect of any company, any person whose voting interest or market 
value interest in that company, aggregated with the voting interest or market value interest or 
interests (as the case may be) of any other person or persons who are at that time associated with 
that person, at that time (calculated, in any case where either the person or any such associated 
person is a company, as if neither that person nor any such associated persons were companies 
and as if sections OD 3(3)(c) and (d) and OD 4(3)(c) and (d) were omitted from this Act) is equal 
to or greater than 50%  
director means—  
(a) a person occupying the position of director by whatever name called: 
(b) in the case of an entity deemed or assumed to be a company by virtue of any provision of this 
Act, which entity does not have directors as such, any trustee, manager, or other person who acts 
in relation to that entity in the same or a similar fashion as a director would act were that entity a 
company incorporated in New Zealand under the Companies Act 1993. 
 
HK 11(11) [Determination of market value and voting interests]  
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this section, a person's market value interest or 
voting interest in a company is determined in accordance with sections OD 2 to OD 4. 
 
B. Scheme of the legislation 
 
Section HK 11
62
 applies if the following specific requirements are satisfied:   
 An arrangement has been entered into in relation to a company;  
 An effect of the arrangement is that the company is unable to satisfy a liability 
of the company for income tax (―the tax liability‖) whether or not the tax 
liability exists at the time of entry into the arrangement or arises subsequently;  
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 It can reasonably be concluded that a director of the company at the time of 
entry into the arrangement who had made all reasonable inquiries into the affairs 
of the company would have anticipated at that time that the tax liability would 
be required to be satisfied (or would be likely to be required to be satisfied) by 
the company; and 
 It can reasonably be concluded that a purpose of the arrangement was that the 
company would be unable to satisfy a tax liability of the company. 
 
Before considering the specific requirements further, it is appropriate to consider the 
approach of the courts in relation to the application of section HK11
63
 generally.  
 
C. Spencer v CIR (2004) 21 NZTC 18,818 
 
The only High Court decision on section HK11
64
 is Spencer v CIR
65
 (―Spencer‖) which 
was a Goods & Services Tax (―GST‖) case in which Paterson J considered the 
application of section 61
66
and section HK11
67
.  However, in Spencer, the issue was 
whether an assessment issued to a company was valid, as the company had been struck 
off before the assessment was made. As a result, while this is the only High Court 
decision on section HK11
68
, the decision in favour of the taxpayer lends no assistance to 
the present research because the ratio decidendi (reason for the decision) deals with tax 
assessment issues instead of an analysis of section HK11
69
 and therefore the Spencer 
case is of very limited assistance to the issues in this dissertation. 
 
Although there is little other case law on this provision or its predecessor, one 
Taxation Review Authority (―TRA‖) case provides helpful guidance. 
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D. Case X11 (2005) 22 NZTC 12,175 
 
The facts 
 
This case concerned a company (―H‖) that was incorporated to borrow and on-lend 
money to its subsidiaries (―S‖). ―S‖ used the money to purchase commercial properties, 
which formed part of an investment and development project.  
 
Due to the lender going into statutory management it called on its loans.  ―H‖ 
was unable to fulfil the repayment request and was then put into receivership. The 
lender sold some of the commercial properties under mortgagee sales. ―H‖ reached a 
compromise with the lender. In exchange for a payment the lender assigned the debt to 
two directors Family Trusts to avoid a base price adjustment under the accruals regime. 
―H‖ claimed interest deductions and made elections to offset losses to ―S‖. The shares 
of ―H‖ were then transferred to a third party in 1998 for a nominal consideration and the 
two original directors resigned.  
 
In July 2000, the CIR issued a Notice of Proposed Adjustment (―NOPA‖) to the 
third party proposing to disallow the deductions and transfer of losses. During the same 
month the company was removed from the Companies Register for failing to file an 
annual return. The CIR applied to the Registrar of Companies to restore the company to 
the register, but the third party owner objected and the CIR did not pursue the matter. In 
December 2000, the CIR issued NOPA‘s to the two former directors advising of an 
intention to recover the company‘s tax liability from them as agents, pursuant to section 
HK11. The two directors objected. 
 
Analysis of the decision 
 
The objection was upheld. In doing so the, Willy DCJ considered the meaning and 
effect of section HK11
70
. In Willy DCJ‘s view the application of section HK1171 is: 
 
―… simply a case of statutory interpretation for which there exists some 
authoritative guidance.‖ 
 
                                                 
70
 Ibid 
71
 Ibid 
 22 
Referring to the provision, Willy DCJ stated at page 12183: 
 
―It is clear from subs. (1) that the intention of the legislature is to allow the 
Commissioner to recover tax from the directors and shareholders of a 
company which has entered into an arrangement an effect or purpose of 
which is to deplete or strip the company‘s assets so that it is unable to meet 
its tax liabilities.‖ 
 
Willy DCJ continued: 
 
―There are three elements which must exist before the section applies: 
[a] There must be an arrangement to which the company is a party; and 
[b] An effect or purpose of the arrangement must be such that the company is 
not able to meet a liability for tax then existing or which arises subsequently; 
and 
[c] It can be reasonably concluded that a director or shareholder would have 
been likely to anticipate that such would be the result of the arrangement and 
that such effect resulted. 
If the Commissioner decided to invoke the section he must decide who in his 
view is the person liable to pay the tax and that person becomes the statutory 
agent of the company.‖ 
 
Willy DCJ was of the view that section HK11
72
 was not a general recovery 
provision, but that the provision focussed on asset stripping by contributories to avoid 
payment of an otherwise lawful demand for income tax 
 
At page 12,186, Willy DCJ referred to Paterson J‘s dicta in Spencer v CIR73 to 
highlight the importance that the company‘s assets must be depleted: 
 
―[34] The general purpose of s HK 11 of the Income Tax Act is to enable the 
Commissioner to recover tax or, in this case, GST from the directors and 
shareholders of a company that has entered into an arrangement or 
transaction to deplete the company‘s assets so that it is unable to fully meet it 
tax liabilities.‖ [emphasis added by Willy DCJ] 
 
Willy DCJ also accepted Thomas J‘s dicta in BNZ Finance Ltd v Holland74that 
assets were stripped from the company, resulting in a benefit to the director. At page 
12,186 and 12,187 Willy DCJ quotes Thomas J as follows: 
 
―A much more sophisticated section, the new s 276 is directed at the liability 
of other persons for tax payable by a company which is left with insufficient 
assets to pay tax. Focusing on arrangements which have the effect of 
rendering a company unable to satisfy its liability for income tax, either the 
existing directors or controlling shareholders or shareholders who derive a 
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material benefit from the arrangement as parties to the arrangements may be 
held liable for the tax liability as agent of the company.  
 
The amendment is clearly directed at liability for tax, whether determined or 
not, and cannot be construed as a ‗recovery provision‘.‖ [emphasis added by 
Willy DCJ] 
 
Willey DCJ then stated at page 12.187 
 
―[Section HK11] is directed to those circumstances where a company is 
liquidated as part of an arrangement the effect of which is to render the 
company unable to pay the tax assessed. That can only mean that there is 
something about the arrangement which produces this result. That something 
must involve depleting the assets of the company. If it did not then to the 
extent the company has assets on liquidation they would be available to meet 
any lawful tax liability‖. 
 
At page 12,187, Willy DCJ concluded that, for section HK11
75
 to become 
available to the CIR, there must be an allegation that there was an arrangement, which 
had an effect of depleting the assets of the company, with the result that it is unable to 
pay it tax liability and further that the company lacks the assets to meet its tax liabilities. 
 
In summary, Case X11
76
 provided the following guidance for the application of 
section HK11
77
: 
 there must be an arrangement to which the company is party, 
 a purpose or effect of the arrangement or transaction must be that the 
company‘s assets are depleted so that it is unable to fully meet its existing 
tax liabilities or those that rise subsequently, 
 the Commissioner must decide who in his view is the person liable to pay 
the tax and that person becomes the statutory agent of the company, 
 a director who derives no benefit from the arrangement cannot be liable, and 
 it must be reasonably concluded that the director would have been likely to 
anticipate that result of the arrangement and that such effect resulted. 
 
As Willy DCJ stated, this is not a developing area of legal policy, but a case of 
statutory interpretation. Each specific requirement for the application of section HK11
78
 
will now be considered 
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E. An arrangement 
 
Although the requirement of whether an arrangement had been entered into in relation 
to a company seems to be listed as a ―stand alone‖ requirement in section HK 1179 it is 
impossible to apply it in isolation. It begs the question: - an arrangement to do what? 
 
This question can be answered by looking at the second requirement of the 
section. That is, was there an arrangement that caused or had an effect that the company 
was unable to satisfy a tax liability? Therefore, to ascertain whether there was an 
arrangement you must look at all transactions that result in the company not being able 
to pay a tax liability and then decide whether those transactions amount to an 
―arrangement‖ within the meaning of the definition of the term. 
 
―Arrangement‖ is defined as80: 
 
―Arrangement‖ means any contract, agreement, plan, or understanding 
(whether enforceable or unenforceable), including all steps and transactions 
by which it is carried into effect:  
 
There are no decided cases on the meaning of an arrangement in the context of 
section HK 11
81
. There are however various decisions on the meaning of the term in the 
context of tax avoidance, section BG1
82
. The leading decision on what is an 
arrangement is Newton v FCT
83
. In that case, Lord Denning stated at page 764: 
 
―… the word "arrangement" is apt to describe something less than a binding 
contract or agreement, something in the nature of an understanding between 
two or more persons--a plan arranged between them which may not be 
enforceable at law. …not only the initial plan, but also all the transactions by 
which it is carried into effect..‖  
 
The definition of arrangement by Lord Denning in Newton v FCT
84
 was 
followed by Elmiger v CIR
85
 and given endorsement by Richardson P in CIR v BNZ 
Investments
86
 where he stated at page 465: 
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‗The definition of arrangement closely follows the meaning given to the 
composite expression ‗contract agreement or arrangement‘ in Newton…‖ 
 
From the words of Lord Denning, two further concepts emerge that require analysis. 
They are: 
1. Contract or agreement; 
2. Plan or understanding 
 
1. Contract or agreement 
 
In Newton v FCT
87
 Lord Denning was of the opinion that ―contract‖ is a technical word 
and implies an agreement enforceable by law. Contract is therefore used in its ordinary 
sense and refers to transactions containing: 
 An offer; 
 Acceptance; 
 Intention to create legal obligations; and 
 Consideration 
 
Both ―contract‖ and ―arrangement‖ appear to be used synonymously. In other words 
they are both enforceable at law. 
 
2. Plan or understanding 
 
In Newton v FCT
88
 Lord Denning‘s delivery said of the term: 
 
―But it must in this section comprehend, not only the initial plan, but also all the transactions 
by which it is carried into effect – all transactions, that is, which have the effect of avoiding 
taxation‖ 
 
From this statement, it is concluded that the concept of plan or understanding has 
two elements: - a physical and mental element. The physical element comprises: 
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1. An initial plan 
2. All the necessary steps in order to execute the plan 
3. The result.  
 
The mental element is the awareness of the taxpayer of the initial plan and a 
willingness to be party to it and undertaking the steps in order to achieve the result.  
 
In Elmiger v CIR
89
after Woodhouse J accepted that the principles established in 
Newton v FCT
90
 were applicable to New Zealand, he made the following comment: 
 
―There clearly was an overall plan preceding the individual steps, and equally 
the intention was that those steps should take effect as a whole.‖  
 
In Tayles v CIR
91
, the scope of ―an arrangement‖ was described as something 
that is not limited to a single document or transaction. Rather, it is necessary to consider 
all relevant dealings or set of circumstances between the parties, in order to establish the 
scope of the arrangement.  
 
The Privy Council in CIR v Europa Oil (No. 1)
92
 put it this way at page 651: 
 
―The documents therefore , in their Lordships opinion, point unequivocally 
towards an interdependence of obligations and benefits under a complex of 
contracts which, though embodied in separate documents represents on 
contractual whole … - that the contractual arrangements were interdependent, 
one on the other.‖ 
 
Arrangement is a complex term and as interpreted by the courts includes the 
formulation of a plan, the execution of that plan in an arranged way and the result. The 
steps are inclusive in identifying the existence of an arrangement. This definition of 
―arrangement‖ is very broad comprising all steps by which it is carried into effect.  In 
CIR v BNZ Investments Limited
93
, the majority of the Court of Appeal considered that 
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that an arrangement cannot exist in a vacuum and that the definition of arrangement 
presupposes there are two or more participants who arrive at an understanding.  
Richardson P stated: 
 
―In short an arrangement involves a consensus, a meeting of minds between 
parties involving an expectation on the part of each that the other will act in a 
particular way. 
… 
The essential thread is mutuality as to content. The meeting of minds 
embodies an expectation as to future conduct. There is consensus as to what 
is to be done. 
… 
A commercially realistic approach should be adopted when assessing the 
extent of the meeting of minds, particularly in cases where a significant 
feature of the arrangement is obtaining and sometimes the sharing, of tax 
benefits. Where that feature is present, a court is unlikely to find persuasive 
the stance of a taxpayer who professes to have no knowledge or expectation 
of the mechanism by which the benefit was to be delivered. In such a 
situation the taxpayer may well appropriately be regarded as having 
authorised or accepted whatever mechanism was actually used. In such 
circumstances a consensus could properly be found in respect of the use of 
that mechanism‖.  
 
Therefore an arrangement requires a meeting of minds between at least two 
parties. That means section HK11
94
 could not be invoked against a single person 
working on his own. Furthermore, by analogy, section HK 11
95
 must encompass the 
entire dimension that amounts to having the effect that a company is unable to pay its 
tax. 
 
However, the law on what constitutes an arrangement has been further 
developed. In a later Privy Council case, Peterson v CIR
96
 Lord Millet rejected the need 
for a meeting of minds between the parties noting also that the taxpayer in question 
need not be party to the arrangements or be privy to its details. Lord Millet said at 
paragraph 34:  
 
―…Their Lordships do not consider that the ―arrangement‖ requires a 
consensus or meeting of minds; the taxpayer need not be a party to ―the 
arrangements‖ and in their view he need not be privy to its details either‖. 
 
This decision provides useful guidance to the application of section HK11
97
. If a 
person does not need to be party to an arrangement for tax avoidance purposes, then 
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under section HK11
98
 the company and those liable may also not be required to be party 
to the arrangement that has the effect of the company not being able to satisfy its tax 
liability.  
 
It may also mean that a director who has no knowledge of the arrangement may 
still be liable under section HK11
99
 unless they meet the circumstances in which the 
director will not be held liable. However, the potential of extending the ambit of section 
HK11 based on the Peterson v CIR
100
 decision is inconsistent with the policy intent of 
the provision. It is creating a higher duty of care for a director which means that they 
would have to be more involved in the daily business of a company if they are to protect 
themselves fully against a claim under section HK11
101
. Strangely though, the court said 
in Peterson v CIR
102
that one can look at part of an arrangement. Petersen v CIR
103
 is 
probably wrong. This places an important focus on the much anticipated upcoming 
Supreme Court decision of Accent Management Ltd v CIR
104
. 
 
F. Effect of the Arrangement 
 
Having considered an arrangement, it is appropriate to consider whether ―an effect of 
the arrangement‖ left the company unable to satisfy its tax liability. In the court of 
Court of Appeal decision of Tayles v CIR
105
 at page 61,318 Mullen J cited with 
approval the Privy Council decision in Newton v FCT
106
 and Ashton v CIR
107
: 
  
 ―Whatever difference of meaning there may be in dictionary terms between 
the words "purpose" or "effect", posed as they seem to be as alternatives in 
sec. 108, they usually have been looked on in the cases as a composite term. 
"The word `purpose' means not motive but the effect which it is sought to 
achieve — the end in view. The word `effect' means accomplished or 
achieved. The whole set of words denotes concerted action to an end — the 
end of avoiding tax." Newton v. F.C. of T. at p. 465. And "if an arrangement 
has a particular purpose, then that will be its intended effect. If it has a 
particular effect, then that will be its purpose ...." Ashton v. C. of I.R. at p. 
61,034‖. 
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Lord Denning in Newton v FCT
108
stated at page 764 
―In applying the section you must, by the very words of it, look at the 
arrangement itself and see which is its effect - which it does – irrespective of 
the motives of the person who made it‖. 
 
It is clear that the motives of the parties are irrelevant in determining the ―effect 
of an arrangement‖ and that it is necessary to objectively consider the arrangement 
itself, to determine what the arrangement does. This will be the ―effect of the 
arrangement‖. 
 
This objective test, having regard to the arrangement, is supported by the High 
Court and the Court of Appeal decisions in Auckland Harbour Board v CIR
109
. 
Although this case considered the anti-avoidance provision in the accrual regime, it is 
nonetheless a useful. This case considered the meaning of the words ―effect of defeating 
the intent and application of‖ the accrual rules. Potter J, in the High Court determined 
that the word ―effect‖ had the meaning ―the result or consequence of an action‖. He 
pointed out that the test was an objective one having regard to the transaction. Potter J 
concluded that the arrangement did have the effect of defeating the intent and 
application of the accrual rules. 
 
The decision of Potter J was however, overturned on appeal. The Court of 
Appeal differed from the High Court in the manner in which they interpreted the 
intended effect of the accrual regime and the manner in which they determined what the 
―effect‖ of the arrangement was. The Court of Appeal considered that Potter J erred, 
because her honour sought to compare what actually happened with what would have 
happened. Richardson P, delivering the majority decision, stated as page 15,451: 
 
―In context, we consider it [―effect‖] has its standard meaning of ―the end 
accomplished or achieved‖  
 
The Court of Appeal considered that it was important to focus the enquiry on 
what actually took place and not on other possible transactions that the taxpayers could 
have undertaken. Therefore, in order to determine the ―effect‖ of an arrangement, it is 
necessary to have regard to what the arrangement itself does. Thus the effect of the 
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arrangement is the end accomplished or achieved. This meaning of ‗effect‖ is consistent 
with the dissenting view of Thomas J in the Court of Appeal decision of CIR v BNZ 
Investments Limited
110
 wherein he stated at page 17,132: 
 
The word ―effect directs the focus to the result or consequence of the 
arrangement…It focuses on the physical characteristics of the 
arrangement…It is sufficient to refer to the succinct statement of Woodhouse 
P in the Challenge Corporation case (at p 533): ―I am satisfied as well that 
the issue..is something to be decided, no subjectively in terms of motive, but 
objectively by reference to the arrangement itself.‖ 
 
The word ―effect‖, in the context of section HK11111 should therefore be 
interpreted similarly. It is an objective test having regard to the outcome or outcomes of 
the arrangement. It is worth noting however that section HK11
112
 uses ―an‖ with the 
noun ―effect‖. This implies that there may be more than one effect. Furthermore the 
section refers to any one effect of the arrangement. Therefore, an ―effects‖ prominence 
or incidental nature is irrelevant.  
 
The use of ―an‖ can be contrasted to the use of ―the‖. In other words, had the 
section been written as ―the effect‖, this would have suggested that the effect was 
possibly the only effect or at least a dominant or over-riding effect. This is not the case 
in section HK11
113.  Hence, ―an effect‖ is merely one result or consequence or end 
accomplished or achieved of the arrangement and may be, then, merely incidental.      
 
So, one result or consequence or end accomplished or achieved of the 
arrangement must be that the company is unable to satisfy a liability for tax. On the 
plain words of the section an effect of the arrangement is that the company is unable to 
satisfy a tax liability. The ordinary meaning of ―unable‖ is ―lacking the skill, means, or 
opportunity to do something‖114. This combined with the fact that it must be an effect of 
the arrangement, suggests that the section was aimed at situations whereby prior to the 
arrangement, the company was able to satisfy a liability for tax, but an arrangement was 
entered into in relation to the company and an effect of that arrangement was that the 
company was now unable to satisfy the liability for tax. 
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Therefore, the word ‗unable‖ connotes an absolute requirement, in that the 
company is either able or unable to satisfy its tax liability. The section requires that an 
effect of the arrangement be that the company is either able or unable to satisfy its tax 
liability. If the company was unable to do this prior to the arrangement whether the 
company became less able after the arrangement is irrelevant. Section HK11
115
 cannot 
be invoked in this situation.  
 
There is no degree of inability either because it is considered that an effect of the 
arrangement will not make the company ―unable‖. The inference is that there was no 
intention that a degree of inability was a consideration for the application of section 
HK11
116
. 
 
However, section HK11
117
 does not refer specifically to the nature of the 
arrangement. The section requires that an effect of the arrangement is that the company 
is unable to satisfy a tax liability, whether existing at the time of entry into the 
arrangement or arising subsequently. Such an arrangement could be where the 
arrangement has the effect of depleting the assets of the company and, therefore, its 
ability to meet that tax liability. 
 
On the basis of the words of the section, the history and the purpose of the 
legislation, it is concluded that the section is intended to catch arrangements by which a 
company is unable to meet a likely tax liability, such as where assets are knowingly 
depleted to this effect. It is not that the arrangement is to avoid paying tax. It is that an 
effect of the arrangement is that the company cannot pay its tax liability.  
 
G. Purpose of the Arrangement 
 
―Purpose‖ is defined as: 
 
―the reason for which something is done or for which something exists‖118.  
 
The courts have considered the meaning of ―purpose‖ in a number of cases.  
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In CIR v BNZ Investment Advisory Services Ltd
119
 Doogue J said at 11,115: 
 
―The parties spent some time in their submissions in respect of the meaning 
of the words ―principle purpose‖. So far as the word ―purpose‖ is concerned, 
there was no real difference between them in their submissions…They were 
agreed that purpose is the object which the taxpayer has in mind or in view. It 
is not synonymous with intention or motive‖. 
 
In Wairakei Court Ltd v CIR
120
 at page 15,206 Chisholm J stated: 
 
―Purpose is a reference to the object that the taxpayer had in mind or in view. 
This is not synonymous with intention or motive. Moreover, care must be 
taken to avoid confusing the means by which the taxpayer achieves its 
purpose with purpose itself‖. 
 
The Court of Appeal in CIR v Wellington Regional Stadium Trust
121
 stated at 
page 19,461: 
 
―The distinction between intention and purpose is thus important in the 
income tax context, as well as in a number of other contexts, including GST 
and competition law‖. 
 
Therefore, ―purpose‘ is a reference to the object that the taxpayer had in mind 
and this is distinct from ―intention‖ and ‗motive‖. There is also a distinction between 
the means by which a purpose is achieved and the purpose itself. Having established 
what is understood by ―purpose‖ it is appropriate to consider the test of purpose. 
 
The Court of Appeal in CIR v National Distributor Ltd
122
 considered ―purpose‖ 
in the context of the Income Tax Act 1976. In particular, the sale or disposition of any 
personal property if, acquired for the purpose of selling or disposing of it. Richardson J 
(as he was then) stated at page 6,350: 
 
―It is well settled that the test of purpose is subjective requiring consideration 
of the state of mind of the purchaser as at the time of acquisition of the 
property. Where the taxpayer is a company it is the collective purpose in the 
minds of those in control of those decisions of the company which is 
determinative‖. 
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Richardson P and Henry J reiterated this test in the Court of Appeal case of CIR 
v National Insurance Co of New Zealand Ltd
123
. It has also been used in a number of 
High Court decisions including King v CIR
124
 and Wellington Regional Stadium Trust v 
CIR
125
.  
 
However, Richardson P‘s subjective test was to test the purpose of a person. In 
contrast, ―purpose‖ in section HK11126 is in relation to an arrangement. The phrase is ―a 
purpose of the arrangement‖. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider whether the test for 
―purpose‖ in relation to an arrangement is the same. 
 
It is noted that the purpose of an arrangement is also relevant for the application 
of shortfall penalties
127
. In that context, the meaning of purpose of an arrangement has 
been considered by the courts. However, it is acknowledged that section 141D
128
 refers 
to a ―dominant‖ purpose of the arrangement.  In contrast, section HK11129 refers merely 
to ―a purpose of the arrangement‖. Despite the additional criteria of ―dominant‖ in 
section 141D
130
, it is concluded that this does not negate the relevance of the view taken 
by the courts on the appropriate meaning given to the purpose of the arrangement. 
 
In relation to the dominant purpose of an arrangement in section 141D
131
, 
Venning J in the High Court decision, Accent Management Ltd v CIR
132
 said at 
paragraphs 367 to 369: 
 
―Mr Stewart [council for the plaintiffs] emphasised the need for the Court to 
make a finding of dominant purpose. He submitted that Ronald Young J was 
incorrect in Erris Promotions to suggest the dominant purpose relates to the 
arrangement itself. He submitted that the better view was it is the purpose of 
the taxpayer to which the section is directed. 
 
In Erris Promotions v CIR (2003) 21 NZTC 18,330 Ronald Young J said at 
paragraph 374: 
―…viewed objectively, the position of the taxpayer must be as a 
consequence of an arrangement that is entered into which has as its 
dominant purpose tax avoidance. And so I must consider if the dominant 
purpose of the joint venture, viewed objectively, was tax avoidance. Here 
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s 141D (7) (b) (i) is concerned not with the taxpayers intent or knowledge 
but with whether their claim for depreciation losses arose as a 
consequence from a scheme which had as its dominant purpose tax 
avoidance.‖ 
 
I agree with Ronald Young J‘s approach. The only matter that can be viewed 
objectively…is whether the arrangement was entered with a dominant 
purpose of avoiding tax. The purpose of the section is to penalise those 
taxpayers who…have entered into…arrangements…with a dominant purpose 
of taking…tax positions that reduce or remove tax liabilities or give tax 
benefits‖ as set out in subs 141D (1) is not met if the objective test is to be 
applied only to whether the taxpayer took a tax position in respect or as a 
consequence of an arrangement. The objective test applies to the assessment 
of dominant purpose‖. 
 
Ronald Young J, in Erris Promotions v CIR
133
 considered that is was not the 
taxpayer‘s intent or knowledge that was relevant but the purpose of the arrangement 
into which the taxpayer entered. Venning J, in Accent Management Ltd v CIR
134
 agreed 
with this approach by Ronald Young J and concluded that the section related to 
arrangements with a dominant purpose and that an objective test applies to the 
assessment of a dominant purpose. Venning J continued by contrasting the taxpayer‘s 
―general interest‖ (a subjective test), with the requirement to view ―objectively the 
dominant purpose of the arrangement‖. 
 
The courts have differentiated between the purpose of the taxpayer and the 
purpose of an arrangement. For the former the test is subjective, but for the purpose of 
an arrangement the test is objective. The purpose of an arrangement does not relate to 
the taxpayer‘s intent or knowledge in entering into the arrangement. The purpose of an 
arrangement is determined by an objective assessment. 
 
In the words of section HK11
135
, although the company entered into an 
arrangement through an agency, being the directors, the purpose of the arrangement is 
not found by considering the state of mind of the agents. The test of purpose in the 
context of section HK11
136
 is objective, as stated by Venning J in Accent Management 
Ltd v CIR
137
. Therefore, whether a purpose of the arrangement was to have the effect of 
depleting the assets of the company so that the company is unable to satisfy the tax 
liability requires an objective consideration of the reason for the arrangement and 
whether the object was that the company would be unable to satisfy a tax liability. 
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Having considered the meaning of purpose, it is relevant to note that section 
HK11
138
 uses the phrase ―a purpose of the arrangement‖. Accordingly, if any purpose of 
the arrangement was to have the effect of depleting the assets of the company, that 
purpose is sufficient. It is not necessary that the purpose be a dominant or principle 
purpose. Therefore, section HK11
139
 applies where it can be reasonably concluded that a 
purpose of the arrangement, which viewed objectively, was to have the effect that the 
company would be unable to satisfy a tax liability. 
 
H. A director would have anticipated that the company be required to satisfy a tax 
liability as a result of the arrangement 
 
The provision
140
 contains a specific definition of director. 
director means—  
(a) a person occupying the position of director by whatever name called: 
(b) in the case of an entity deemed or assumed to be a company by virtue of 
any provision of this Act, which entity does not have directors as such, any 
trustee, manager, or other person who acts in relation to that entity in the 
same or a similar fashion as a director would act were that entity a company 
incorporated in New Zealand under the Companies Act 1993. 
 
By reference to the Companies Act 1993 in the definition its implication is that 
the definition and duties of a director as specified in the Companies Act 1993 apply 
equally to section HK11
141
.  The director of a company includes ―de facto directors‖, 
―shadow directors‖ and ―deemed directors‖142.  
 
Furthermore, the person must occupy the position of director even though they 
may not be specifically referred to as a director. Evidence to support this would be 
found in the way the person (s) acted combined with their responsibilities, activities and 
decision making powers. In Mistmorn Pty Ltd (in Liq.) v Michael Yasseen
143
, Mr 
Yasseen was held to be a director as the Court believed he undertook obligations that 
indicated he was a director, even though his wife was the only appointed director of the 
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liquidated company. Mr Yasseen‘s duties included negotiating leases on behalf of the 
company; arranging the fit out of the business premises and arranging the opening of 
the business by the mayor and speaking at the opening when his wife was present.   
 
The definition also extends to an entity that is not a company, such as a trust or 
unincorporated society and extends the same treatment to persons who act in a similar 
fashion as a director as if that entity was a company. Therefore trustees of a trust may 
also be potentially liable under section HK 11
144
. However, thus far, the CIR has not 
sought to bring such an action against any trustees of a trust that is unable to satisfy its 
tax liability.     
 
Furthermore, section HK11
145
 refers to a hypothetical director. The reference is 
to a director, at the relevant time, who made all reasonable inquiries into the affairs of 
the company. The director would then have anticipated at that time the tax liabilities to 
be satisfied by the company. This is part of the test to determine whether section 
HK11
146
 applies. The test is an objective one. It also follows that where the facts relate 
to a sole director of a company, as opposed to a company having a board of directors, 
the test relates to a hypothetical sole director at the time of entry into the arrangement. 
 
There are a number of requirements to consider for the application of this part of 
the provision. These are: 
 The time when it is necessary that a director would have anticipated the 
company‘s tax liability or the likelihood of such liability; 
 The meaning of ―reasonable‖; and 
 Whether a director having made those inquiries, would have anticipated at the 
time of entry into the arrangement that the tax liability would be or likely to be 
required to be satisfied by the company.   
 
1. The time 
 
Firstly, it relates to the identification of the hypothetical director. The section 
refers to ―a director of the company at the time of entry into the arrangement”. In this 
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instance, there is an express reference to the relevant time being, “at the time of entry 
into the arrangement”. So the section only applies to a person who is a director at the 
time of entry into the arrangement. 
 
Secondly, it relates to the time at which reasonable inquiries were made. The 
section states that “a director…who made all reasonable inquiries into the affairs of the 
company”. In this instance, there is no express reference to the timing of those inquiries, 
so it is appropriate to consider the section as a whole to determine the intended timing 
of this component. 
 
Thirdly, it relates to the anticipation of the tax liability and the time at which it 
can be reasonably concluded that the tax liability could be anticipated. The section 
states “a director…would have anticipated at that time that the tax liability would be or 
would be likely to be, required to be satisfied by the Company under this Act”. The 
relevant and express timing words are “at that time”. This can only refer to the time of 
entry into the arrangement.  
 
This is the express time stated in relation to the identification of the hypothetical 
director. Therefore, when the section is considered as a whole, it is clear that a single 
time is relevant for each of the components. The timing for each is the time of entry into 
the arrangement. Accordingly, it is considered that the section is required to be applied 
based on the circumstances that existed at the time of entry into the arrangement. This 
means that circumstances that would only be discovered by making inquiries 
subsequent to the time of entry into the arrangement will not be relevant, given the 
statutory wording. 
 
2. Meaning of “reasonable” 
 
Reasonableness is an objective standard to be concluded from the facts of a 
particular case. Therefore, what are “reasonable inquiries into the affairs of the 
company” will vary with every factual situation. 
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This is consistent with the approach of the High Court in Vinyl Processors (New 
Zealand) Ltd v Cant
147
. Hillyer J held that the word ―reasonable‖ imported an objective 
test of reasonableness and the existence of ―reasonable grounds‖ must be tested by the 
standard of an officer of the company of reasonable competence. 
 
Vinyl Processors concerned the liability of the directors of the company for the 
company‘s debts. Although the directors knew that the company was making losses, 
they continued to trade for a further year, and thereby substantially increased the 
company‘s losses, before a receiver and liquidator were ultimately appointed. The 
liquidator brought proceedings against the directors under section 320 (1) of the 
Companies Act 1955, which empowers the Court to make such a declaration if, in the 
course of the winding up of a company, it appears amongst other things that: 
 
(a) Any person was, while an officer of the company, knowingly a 
party to the contracting of a debt by the company and did not, at 
the time the debt was contracted, honestly believe on reasonable 
grounds that the company would be able to pay the debt when it 
fell due for payment as well as all its other debts, (including 
future and contingent debts); 
 
The Court held that the word reasonable in section 320 (1) (a)
148
 imports an 
objective test and must be tested by the standard of an officer of the company of 
reasonable competence. Offences under section 320 (1) (a)
149
(now section 135 to 
137
150) are knowledge offences concerning the directors‘ conduct. Section 135151, in 
looking whether the conduct is “likely to create a substantial risk” to creditors, is 
similar to section HK11
152
, which considers whether the directors should have 
anticipated that a tax liability „would be likely to be required to be satisfied”.  
 
Therefore, it is considered that the terms ―reasonably be concluded” and “all 
reasonable inquiries” used in section HK11153 imply an objective test as to whether a 
director of reasonable competence is likely to have reached that conclusion based on 
reasonable inquiries and concluded from the facts.   
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3. Anticipated the tax liability to be satisfied 
 
“Anticipate” is defined154 as meaning ―to expect‖. In the present discussion this 
meaning will be used. Using this meaning of “anticipate”, a requirement for section 
HK11
155
 to apply is that it can be concluded on an objective basis that at the time of 
entry into the arrangement, a director would have to expect that the company would 
have a tax liability to be satisfied. 
 
The term “likely” as used in section HK11156 is also not defined in the Income 
Tax Act. However, the most relevant definition
157
 of the term is as follows:  
 
Likely - probable; that looks as if it would happen; to be reasonably expected. 
 
In Commissioner of Police v Ombudsman
158
the High Court considered the term 
“would be likely”, as used in section 6(c)159. Jefferies J held stated at page 589 that: 
 
―The words ―would be likely‖ I consider mean that there is a distinct, or 
significant possibility that the result might occur, but no higher than that. On 
the scale of probability it is above a slight chance and below an expectation‖. 
 
Accordingly the phrase “would be likely to be” refers to a tax liability that can 
reasonably be expected to arise with some degree of certainty. Therefore, it can then be 
concluded that section HK11
160
 requires that a hypothetical director at the time of entry 
into the arrangement who made all reasonable inquiries into the affairs of the company 
would regard as probable, at that time, that the tax liability would be required to be 
satisfied 
 
The above analysis is considered when section HK11
161
 applies. However, part 
of section HK11
162
 also sets out its consequences. It is therefore appropriate to consider 
the provision‘s reference to ―tax liability‖ and ―benefit‖  
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4. “Tax liability” and “benefit” 
 
 If the conditions in section HK 11
163
 are satisfied all directors of the company at 
the time the arrangement was entered into are jointly and severally liable for the tax 
liability as agents of the company
164
.  Directors will not be liable if the CIR is satisfied 
that they derived no benefit from the arrangement and they have either dissented from 
the arrangement and notified the CIR accordingly or have not participated in the 
decision to enter into the arrangement
165
.  
 
The shareholders of the company on the other hand are liable if at the time the 
arrangement was entered into they are either:  
 controlling shareholders; or  
 they have a voting interest or market value interest in the company and it can 
reasonably be concluded that (having regard to the materiality of the benefit 
derived by the shareholders from the arrangement) they were parties to the 
arrangement. 
 
The shareholders are then liable for: 
 the tax liability of the company to the extent of the greater of the market value of 
their direct and indirect shareholding in the company at the time the arrangement 
was made
166
; and 
 the proportion of the late payment penalty or interest comprising part of the tax 
liability, which reflects the proportion of the tax liability for which they are 
liable
167
. 
 
But, the liability of shareholders is limited.  Shareholders are liable up to a 
maximum amount of the core income tax. The core tax being the company‘s tax liability 
excluding late payment penalties and interest for late payment.  The maximum amount 
of the core income tax for which a shareholder is liable cannot exceed an amount equal 
to the greater of: 
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 the market value of the shareholder‘s direct and indirect interest in the company 
at the time of the arrangement; and 
 the value of any benefit derived from the shareholder under the arrangement. 
 
The meaning of ―joint and several liability‖ was explained in Grunwald v Hughes168 
in the following terms: 
 
―Perhaps the best account of the meaning of a conclusion for joint and 
several liability is that given by Lord McLaren in Fleming v Gemmill [1908] 
SC 340 at page 345, 15 SLT 691, at page 693, where he said: 
 
the word ‗several‘ implies that against whatever number of defenders a man 
proceeds, each is liable for the whole sum sued for, and the word ‗jointly‘ or 
‗conjunctly‘ secures to those against whom the decree is made operative the 
right of rateable relief against the persons who have not paid‖. 
 
That description shows that the essential of the joint and several liability is 
that each defender should be liable for the whole damage.  (p. 214-215)‖ 
 
Therefore, the entire amount of the company‘s tax liability may be recovered 
from any of the directors but each of the directors has a right to recover a contribution 
from other directors.  However, the liability of shareholders in respect of core tax is 
limited to the greater of the market value of their direct and indirect interest in the 
company at the time the arrangement was entered into together with a proportion of the 
late payment penalty and interest based on the proportion of the core tax for which they 
are liable. 
 
There appears to be no policy reason for shareholders being liable for interest 
and any late payment penalty while the directors are not liable.  A director is potentially 
liable for a greater amount than a shareholder as shareholders are liable only for a 
proportion of core income tax and a proportion of the interest and late payment penalties 
on the income tax but apportionment is not required to establish the liability of 
directors. Directors are jointly and severally liable for the company‘s tax liability.   
 
The business and affairs of the company must be managed by or under the 
control of the directors and the directors have all the powers necessary for managing the 
company and supervising and directing its management
169
. In some circumstances a 
shareholder is deemed to be a director, including where the company‘s constitution 
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confers a power on shareholders which would otherwise fall to be exercised by the 
board of directors
170
.   
 
A director for the purpose of section HK 11
171
 is a person who occupies the 
position of director ―by whatever name called‖172. However, a director who has not 
derived a benefit from the arrangement or transaction and who has not participated in 
the decision to enter into the arrangement will not be liable
173
.    
 
One of the conditions for the application of section HK 11
174
 is that it can 
reasonably be concluded that a director should have anticipated that the company would 
be required to satisfy a tax liability.  Hence, the limitation of the liability of the 
shareholders while the directors are potentially liable for the entire amount of the 
company‘s tax liability reflects the greater power of the directors to manage the affairs 
of the company, in particular, the power to determine whether the company enters into 
an arrangement or not. 
 
The background research indicates that it was contemplated that directors would 
have greater liability than shareholders because of their greater influence over the affairs 
of the company.  A Report to the Ministers of Finance and Revenue from Treasury 
dated 30 July 1991 stated: 
 
―This approach would provide a disincentive to directors and shareholders 
being party to an asset stripping arrangements while at the same time 
ensuring that shareholders with a controlling interest in a company who were 
not a party to the arrangements are not penalised too heavily by the 
company‘s decision to proceed with that arrangement‖. 
 
The report also indicates that it was considered that where a shareholder does 
not have a controlling interest in a company but derives a benefit, an inference could be 
drawn that the shareholder was a party to the arrangement
175
.   
 
The joint Treasury and IRD report on submissions relating to the amendment of 
section 276
176
 dated 24 January 1992 (―the Officials‘ Report‖) contains discussion of a 
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submission that the liability of directors should be limited to the greater of the market 
value of the company at the time the arrangement was entered into and the value of any 
benefits derived from the arrangement.  It was submitted that it was unfair to require 
directors and shareholders to guarantee the income tax liabilities of a company.  This 
submission was declined because it was considered that it was not appropriate to limit 
the liability of the directors in that manner as the directors could reasonably be expected 
to have known of the arrangement and directors can escape liability if they satisfy the 
requirements of section HK 11(6)
177
.  The Report says: 
 
As long as it is possible for dissenting directors to avoid liability under 
section 276 in certain circumstances (as proposed elsewhere in this report), 
the remaining directors are the proper target of the section.  Such directors 
would be liable where it can reasonably be concluded that they knew or 
should have known of the actions pertaining to the asset stripping 
arrangements.  Given this requirement, it is not considered appropriate to 
limit the amount of tax recovered as proposed in the submission. 
 
Therefore, the relative roles and powers of the directors and shareholders are 
expressed by inference to specific reference to interest and late payment penalties in 
section HK 11(4)
178
.   
 
Subject to the time bar, an assessment of a company that has been liquidated 
may be issued or amended for the purposes of giving effect to section HK11
179
 as if the 
company had not been liquidated. If an assessment is made or amended in respect of a 
company that has been liquidated, the CIR is required to nominate the person(s) whom 
the CIR considers to be liable for the tax liability specified in the assessment and that 
person(s) is/are to be treated as agent(s) of the company. This includes the right to 
challenge the CIR‘s application of s HK11180. 
 
The status of the company when the CIR seeks to apply the recovery section is a 
contentious point. This arises as a result of the tension between the role of the liquidator 
under the Companies Act 1993 and the Insolvency Act 1967, and the rights to object to 
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the application of section HK11
181
. However, the objection procedure is depended on 
whether section HK11
182
 is a charging or recovery provision. 
5. Meaning of „recovery” 
 
Income tax is imposed on taxable income of a taxpayer for a tax year
183
. This obligation 
is only discharged when Inland Revenue receives a tax return and payment, if any. 
Liability for income tax is imposed by the Income Tax Act and arises once an 
assessment has been made. An assessment quantifies a taxpayer‘s tax liability184. 
Therefore, before a debt in respect of tax can be recovered, an assessment is necessary 
to quantify the liability.  The following comments in CIR v Allen
185
 indicate that the 
assessment establishes the debt in respect of tax: 
 
When the proceedings were issued there were assessments in place, which by 
reason of s 109 of the Tax Administration Act, established the indebtedness 
of Mr Allen.  If the actions taken by Mr Allen constituted an effective 
challenge to those assessments with the effect that 50% of the amount 
assessed was no longer payable, this would fairly warrant the conclusion that 
judgment should not be entered against him on the assessments.  
 
However, it is section 156
186
 that authorises the CIR to recover all unpaid taxes 
for the crown.  
 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary definitions of “recover” and “recovery” are: 
 
Recover 
Secure (restitution, compensation, damages or abs.) by legal process 
 
Recovery 
Act or process of recovering or being recovered. 
 
In Re Gilbert Machinery Co (No1)
187
 Stout CJ considered the meaning of the 
term ―recover‖: 
 
The word ―recover‖ has been held to mean something more than suing.  In 
Hanes v Welch (1866) LR 4 Cp 91 ―recover‖ was held to mean ―to obtain in 
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any legal manner‖, and hence it was said that it gave the right to distrain for 
rent by action, the learned and eminent judge, Mr Justice Wiles, saying   
 
―The word ‗recover‘ is now often used in the larger sense of obtaining in any 
legal manner‖.   
 
And a petition to wind up is a mode of obtaining in a legal manner the 
payments of debts:  see per Richmond J in Re Extended Wapato Gold Mining 
Company (Limited) Moore v Cuff and others [1894[13 NZLR 544.  In Morris 
v Duncan [19899] 1 QB 4 DC it was held that ―recovery‖ did not limit the 
proceedings that could be taken to an action.  A proceeding before Justices 
was authorised by the word ―recover‖.  In Howard v Baillie (1796] 2 Hay Bal 
618 it was said: 
 
―Thus an authority to receive and recover debts includes a power to arrest‖. 
 
Now, the proceeding by petition is a mode of recovering a debt, for it is often 
successful without the proceeding to wind up being continued, and the 
petition may be withdrawn:  see amongst many other cases to this effect, the 
case of Re Times Life Assurance and Guarantee Company (1869) LR 9 Esq 
382.  (p. 50) 
 
Therefore, the recovery of tax means the process of recovery of a debt in respect 
of tax (quantified by an assessment) by legal means and the successful outcome of that 
process.  It is therefore necessary to outline the purpose of section HK 11
188
 in order to 
decide its relationship with sections 156
189
. 
 
The legislative history confirms that the objective of section HK 11
190
 is to 
enable the CIR to recover outstanding tax.  Even though there have been many 
modifications to this provision its purpose has not altered.   
 
The Officials‘ report to the amendment of section 276191 stated: 
 
―… section 276 of the Income Tax Act is to be replaced with a better targeted 
provision. That provision will allow the Commissioner to recover tax from 
directors and shareholders of companies that have entered into arrangements 
or transactions to deplete the assets of the company so that it has been unable 
to meet its tax liability. 
… 
 
Recovery of the outstanding tax that results from these asset stripping 
arrangements will be sought from those taxpayers that were directors and 
shareholders of the company at the time the arrangement was entered into. 
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The Officials‘ Report also indicates that the exact liability of each director and 
shareholder was not specified to allow the CIR the same flexibility as any other creditor 
in respect of debt recovery: 
 
The section does not prescribe how the liability will be allocated between the 
various parties and is typical of other sections that impute joint and several 
liability for tax (such as the trust provisions in the Act).  This approach 
ensures that the Commissioner has the ability to operate as any commercial 
creditor would.  Typically, in the commercial debt recovery field, recovery of 
the debt is first sought from those persons who are both easily accessible and 
financially liquid.  To deprive the Commissioner of this ability is at odds with 
the philosophy that the Commissioner should operate under the standard 
commercial debt recovery procedures. 
 
Section HK 11(7)
192
 and (8)
193
 indicate that it was intended that any assessment 
necessary to give effect to section HK 11
194
 would be made in respect of the company 
regardless of whether the company was still in existence. The debt of the company for 
income tax would be established by an assessment in respect of the company.   
 
In my view, the difference between a charging provision and a recovery 
provision is that a charging provision imposes liability for income tax and permits an 
assessment to be made whereas a recovery provision relates to the mechanics of 
collection or recovery of a debt, the amount of which has been established and 
quantified by an assessment.   
 
In BNZ Finance Ltd v CIR
195
, which concerned section 276
196
 in it is original 
form, McKay J said: 
 
As Richardson P has pointed out, the liability for tax is imposed by the Act 
itself: s 38(2). Other sections provide for the making of assessments, and for 
the payment and recovery of tax. The Commissioner may amend any 
assessment in order to ensure its correctness: s 23. The assessment process is 
therefore a step in the quantification of the underlying liability. It is subject to 
the objection procedure, and is subject to amendment. The liability exists, 
however, even before assessment. 
 
Mr Harley, for BNZ Finance Ltd, submitted that s 276 was a collection or 
recovery provision, and not a charging provision. The wording of the section 
does not support this. The operative words are ―shall be deemed to be the 
agent ... and shall be liable for all tax payable ...‖. These are not words 
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limited to the mechanics of collection or recovery. They are words imposing 
liability.  (p. 13,165-13,167) 
 
Thomas J said: 
 
I consider that an interpretation restricting s 276(3) to a provision authorising 
the recovery of income tax which has been quantified, or which is capable of 
being quantified, at the time a company ceases to carry on business in New 
Zealand is an unduly strained construction of the subsection.  (p. 13,171) 
 
 
In BNZ Finance Ltd v CIR
197
the taxpayer argued that section 276
198
 was a 
recovery provision rather than a charging provision in that it permitted the CIR to 
recover by way of demand an established debt but did not authorise an assessment to be 
made in respect of any person, including an agent and that the words “liable to be 
assessed” did not include a contingent liability.  The issue of whether the former section 
276
199
 permitted an assessment to be made to BNZ Finance Limited was relevant 
because it was not possible to issue an assessment to the original company, BNZ 
Deposits Ltd (―Deposits‖), a subsidiary of BNZ Finance Limited which had been struck 
off in 1994.  Amended assessments for the 1989 and 1990 years issued by the CIR to 
Deposits in 1995 were nullities as it did not exist at the time the assessments were 
issued.  The CIR subsequently wrote to BNZ Finance Limited advising that he intended 
to assess BNZ Finance Limited for the tax owed by Deposits under section 276
200
.   
 
Under section 276
201
 a “new company” was deemed to be the agent of the 
“original company”.  The court considered that section 276202 permitted the “new 
company” to be assessed for the tax liability of the “original company” as the general 
agency provisions
203
 applied to agents under section 276
204
.  The general agency 
provisions under the Income Tax Act 1976 required agents to make returns in respect of 
income of which they were agents and to be assessed in respect of the income as if they 
were principals.   
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BNZ Finance Ltd v CIR
205
 concerned a case where the “original company” had 
not been assessed and it was no longer possible to assess the “original company” as it 
had been struck off.  The case established that in those circumstances an assessment 
could be made in respect of the “new company”.  The “new company” was liable for 
income tax for which the “original company” was “liable to be assessed”.   
 
However, Instant Finance Ltd v CIR
206
 (which also related to the original form 
of section 276
207
) concerned a situation where a valid assessment had been made in 
respect of the “original company” and the “original company” had not objected to the 
assessment.  Instant Finance Ltd v CIR
208
 established that in such circumstances the 
demand made by the CIR on the “new company” under section 276209 was also an 
assessment in a limited sense so that the “new company” had the right to challenge 
whether the condition for its liability under section 276
210
 existed. 
 
If section HK 11
211
 had been applied to the circumstances of the BNZ Finance 
Ltd v CIR
212
 case (that is, where an assessment had not been made before the company 
was struck off or where the Commissioner sought to amend an assessment after the 
company was struck off), section HK 11(7)
213
 would permit any assessment required to 
establish the amount of the company‘s tax liability to be made in respect of the 
company although the company had been liquidated.  Where an assessment has been 
made in respect of a company that had been liquidated, the persons held liable under 
section HK 11
214
 are entitled as agents of the company to receive notice of the 
assessment and to challenge the assessment [section HK 11(8)
215
].  Therefore, unlike 
under section 276
216
 in its original form, it is not necessary to establish that section HK 
11
217
 authorises an assessment in respect of the persons held liable.   
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The procedures set out in section HK 11(7)
218
 and (8)
219
 were not followed in 
Spencer & Anor v CIR
220
 that involved an assessment in respect of the company of 
which Mr Prestidge was a director.   This led to a finding that the assessment was 
invalid because the company did not exist at the time the assessment was made. 
 
Section HK 11
221
 contemplates that any assessment made would be made in 
respect of the company.  That being the case, it could be argued that section HK 11
222
 is 
a recovery provision in that it enables the recovery from the directors or shareholders of 
a debt of the company in respect of income tax, the amount of which is established by 
the assessment made in respect of the company.   
 
However, the following obiter comments of Thomas J in the BNZ Finance Ltd v 
CIR
223
 indicates that he considered that section HK 11
224
 was not merely a recovery 
provision: 
 
Although the new provision is much more comprehensive than the section it 
replaces, the same legislative approach is evident in both sections. The 
underlying concept of holding persons, whether substantially the same 
shareholders or the same directors who benefit from the cessation of the other 
company, liable as agents for the original company's tax liability is retained. 
The amendment is clearly directed at liability for tax, whether 
determined or not, and cannot be construed as a “recovery provision”. 
The assumption may be plausibly made, I believe, that Parliament has 
approached the subject with a consistent mind, and to that extent it provides 
some support, albeit far from decisive, for the meaning sought by the 
Commissioner.  (p. 13,176) [Emphasis added] 
 
In the Officials‘ Report it was considered that generally the company should 
have the right to object to the assessment where the company still exists as the 
assessment relates to income of the company and that to provide additional objection 
rights to the shareholders in respect of the same issues would delay the recovery of tax.  
It was considered that objection rights should be given to the nominated agents where a 
company had ceased to exist and was, therefore, unable to object to an assessment.  
Therefore, it was considered, on submission, that the CIR should be required to give 
notice of assessments to all persons nominated as liable for the company‘s tax liability 
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(in order to ensure that such persons have a right to object to the assessment) should be 
rejected: 
 
Section 276(7) [section HK 11(7)] operates only for companies that have 
been wound up and does not cover companies still in existence. 
 
In the event that the company has wound up and a new or amended 
assessment is issued, the nominated agents will be liable for any tax.  These 
agents will have the usual objection provisions available to them.  This is 
necessary as the company cannot object to the re-assessment given that it is 
no longer in existence. 
 
For the more general case where the company is still in existence, given that 
it is the company being reassessed, it is the company that has the right of 
objection.  This is important given the record requirements and other 
provisions of the Act.  The nominated agents do not have any tax assessed – 
they are merely liable for the company tax as agents.  Therefore, they do not 
have the objection procedures available to them.  To allow individuals to 
have additional objection procedures would result in the same issues that 
were litigated or discussed with the company being raised again.  A 
consequence would be a further delay in the recovery of tax due to the 
revenue. 
 
The Officials‘ Report also indicates that it contemplated the procedure for 
notifying directors and shareholders of their liability under section HK 11
225
 would be 
by way of notice of recovery rather than by way of assessment.  In response to a 
submission that directors and shareholders should become liable once the CIR has 
nominated them and that the CIR should be required to nominate all parties to the 
arrangement as liable, the Officials considered: 
 
The mechanism for notification of directors and shareholders of their liability 
will be via a notice of recovery rather than a reassessment of the directors or 
shareholders.  The ability of the Commissioner to choose the persons from 
whom he seeks recovery is consistent with existing commercial practices.  
Typically, this will be from the person who is both easily accessible and 
financially liquid.  To deprive the Commissioner of this ability is at odds with 
the philosophy that the Commissioner should operate under the standard 
commercial debt recovery procedures. 
 
As with commercial practice for debt recovery, nominated persons are liable 
for the full amount of the liability.  It is up to them to seek compensation for 
any amount recovered from them that exceed what they perceive to be their 
share of the liability. 
 
Therefore, the liability imposed by section HK 11
226
 is not a liability to be 
assessed; it imposes a liability on the agent to pay the income tax liability owed by the 
company.  Whilst section HK11
227
 extends the liability of directors beyond the 
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traditional realms of director‘s duties the CIR still has an overriding obligation to 
acknowledge taxpayer‘s rights including taxpayers who are deemed agents of other 
taxpayers who have an outstanding tax liability. There is still a large amount of work 
required in this area to allow this recovery mechanism to operate as legislation intended. 
 
I. Tax & the corporate veil 
 
Section HK11
228
 makes directors and shareholders of a company liable for company tax 
in certain situations thus piercing the corporate veil. Piercing the corporate veil is 
something that courts are generally reluctant to do, and section HK11
229
 is rare in that it 
specifically prescribes a situation in which the courts are allowed to pierce the veil.  
 
A common misconception is that imposing liability on directors of the company 
is not recognised as piercing the corporate veil, as directors are part of the company. 
And, it is only when liability is imposed on shareholders beyond their liability for the 
value of their shares that the corporate veil is genuinely pierced. But, directors could 
also be shareholders which often occur with smaller entities that are owner operated. 
Furthermore, regardless of whether corporate liability is imposed on shareholders or 
director the fact remains that the debts of the company are imputed to such third parties. 
Imposing liability on directors is specifically regarded as piercing the corporate veil.    
 
The purpose of the section is to make liable for the tax of a company those 
persons that had sufficient control of the company when it entered into an arrangement 
that left the company unable to meet its tax liabilities. It is not just directors and 
controlling shareholders that may be liable for the company‘s tax, but also non-
controlling shareholders who, it is reasonable to conclude, were parties to the 
arrangement. 
 
There are four requirements for the section to apply: 
1. The arrangement must be entered into in relation to a company; 
2. One of the effects of the arrangement must be that the company is unable 
to meet its existing or subsequent tax liability; 
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3. A director having made reasonable inquiries would have realised that a 
tax liability existed; 
4. It is reasonable to conclude that a purpose of the arrangement was to 
leave the company unable to meet its tax liability 
 
Imposing liability on shareholders for the liabilities of a company is the act that 
actually pieces the corporate veil. However, under section HK11
230
 directors may also 
be held liable for the company‘s tax liability. Any director at the time of the 
arrangement is ―jointly and severally‖ liable for the tax liability of the company. 
‗Jointly and severally‖ means that directors can be held liable either all together or a 
single director can be held liable for the entire amount. 
 
Any director can escape liability on the basis that the director did not know of 
the arrangement at the time it was entered into and was not involved in the management 
of the company at the time. The director must also register his or her objection to the 
arrangement with the Company as soon as he or she becomes aware of it and notify the 
Commissioner of the arrangement and the objection to it. The director must also not 
have received any benefit from the arrangement. 
 
Two types of shareholders may also be held liable for some of the tax liability of 
the company. First, controlling shareholders can be held liable. A controlling 
shareholder is a person who, together with an associated person, holds 50% or more of 
the voting shares in the company or 50% more of the market value of the company. 
Secondly, a non-controlling shareholder can be held liable for some of the tax liability 
of the company if, at the time the arrangement was entered into, having regard to the 
benefit the person received from the arrangement, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
person was a party to the arrangement. 
 
Directors and shareholders are not normally liable to pay company tax; the 
primary liability rests with the company. This is a consequence of the principle of 
corporate personality, that the taxes are those of the company and not the directors and 
shareholders.  
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However, section HK11
231
 recognises that there will be occasions where it is 
appropriate for the CIR to look beyond the guise of the company to those people who 
are in control of the asset stripping exercise. This helps to maintain the integrity of the 
tax system thereby preventing the tax base from being eroded by the action of negligent 
or fraudulent directors. It is yet to be determined what effect the application of section 
HK11
232
 has on the rights of a director and shareholder to challenge the underlying tax 
liability that the company is unable to satisfy. 
 
J. Summary 
 
In summary, it is considered that the application of section HK11
233
 is a hypothetical 
test and requires: 
 An arrangement, being a contract, agreement or understanding, enforceable or 
unenforceable, including all steps and transactions to carry it into effect, has 
been entered into in relation to a company; and 
 An effect of the arrangement (being any one result or consequence or end 
accomplished of the arrangement) is that a company is unable to meet a likely 
tax liability; and 
 It can be concluded on an objective basis that a director of reasonable 
competence at the time of entry into the arrangement, who made all reasonable 
inquiries into the affairs of the company would regard as probable at that time 
that a tax liability would be required to be satisfied; and 
 It can be concluded on an objective basis that a purpose of the arrangement, 
which when considered objectively, was to have the effect of depleting the 
assets of the company so that the company was unable to meet a likely tax 
liability. 
 
If the requirements of section HK11
234
 are satisfied, all directors at the time of 
entry into the arrangement are jointly and severally liable for the tax liability of the 
company, that liability being inclusive of interest and civil penalties. 
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However, a director is not liable for a tax liability if the CIR is satisfied that the 
director derived no benefit from the arrangement and either formerly dissented to the 
arrangement or was not involved in the executive management of the company and had 
no knowledge of the arrangement 
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VII. ALTERNATE REMEDIES 
 
A. Commercial Law 
 
One of the main reasons for establishing a company when beginning business, instead 
of operating for example as a sole trader, is to limit the liability of shareholders. The 
reasons companies have a separate legal personality are mainly to enable investors to 
pool their capital/resources and then to delegate management of the company to ‗expert‘ 
managers aka directors. The law limits the liability of the investors to the extent of their 
investments/contributions (i.e. paid up share capital) to enable this capital-pooling and 
delegation of management arrangement to work. 
 
 Limited Liability is a privilege which should not be abused at the expense of the 
creditors of the company. It is immediately concerning when a company is established 
with one shareholder who is also a director. Given that there is no pooling of capital and 
no delegation of management in such scenarios, it is apparent that probably the main 
motive for forming such a company is to take advantage of the privilege of limited 
liability at the expense of creditors of the company. 
 
 Accordingly, the potential and incentive for abuse of the corporate veil and 
defrauding of creditors of the company is high risk in such scenarios. Setting up a 
company does not, however completely absolve shareholders and, more particularly 
directors from potential personal liability  
 
The Companies Act 1993 reinforces the statutory obligations of directors and 
provides mechanisms by which liquidators, in particular, can pursue actions against 
directors and shareholders to recover shortfalls to the company‘s creditors. These 
remedies or actions are only available to a liquidator of a company and not a receiver 
(except in the case of overdrawn current accounts). 
 
The possibility of recovering money or assets from directors or shareholders is 
one of the principle reasons why Inland Revenue should not give up on potential 
recoveries of debt after a company goes into liquidation, even where a company has no 
obvious assets. However, these actions are expensive and time consuming.   
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a. Separate legal personality 
 
A company is a separate legal entity from those who may own shares or be involved in 
the running of the company. The company, as a ‗person‘ is distinguished from its 
members. A shareholder‘s liability to the debts of a limited liability company is limited 
to the amount unpaid on shares and in the vast majority of cases is zero. This means that 
the company is fully liable. However, this protection can be lost if the 
director/shareholder is reckless in giving personal guarantees. The effect of companies 
being a separate legal person was recognised and entrenched by the decision of Salomon 
v. Salomon & Co Ltd
235
. 
 
Mr Salomon was a successful boot and shoe manufacturer. Mr Salomon formed 
a company and sold his sole trader business to the newly established company. Mr 
Salomon and members of his family were the only shareholders of the company. The 
company was funded primarily through share capital and debentures issued to Mr 
Salomon. Shortly after the company started trading, it fell upon hard times. Despite 
efforts by Mr Salomon to rescue the company it was liquidated.  
 
When the company failed, the value of its assets was insufficient to satisfy all 
debts. Mr Salomon as debenture holder was entitled to preferential status above other 
creditors. The liquidator claimed that the company was a sham and brought proceedings 
against Mr Salomon. 
 
The House of Lords held: 
 
―Either the limited company was a legal entity or it was not. If it was, the 
business belonged to it and not to Mr Salomon. If it was not, there was no 
person and no thing to be agent at all; and it is impossible to say at the same 
time that there is a company and there is not‖. 
 
The House of Lord‘s decision recognises that the limited liability and the 
protection of shareholders and directors from responsibility for acts done in the name of 
the company are consequences of incorporation. That in itself is a mechanism that 
recognises the concept of separate legal personality. 
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This principle has been codified in New Zealand under section 15
236
. However, 
in one such case, Trevor Ivory Ltd v Anderson
237
, the court found that where there was a 
breach of a duty of care by a director that director may be held personally liable for 
negligence. Cook P stated at page 67,617: 
 
―When he formed the company, Mr Ivory made it plain to all the world that 
limited liability was intended…such a limitation is a common fact of 
business and, in relation to economic loss and duties of care, the 
consequences should in my view be accepted in the absence of special 
circumstances‖. 
 
This comment illustrates that the Court is prepared to look through the separate 
personality of a company in certain circumstances which includes through to the actions 
of the director (s). 
 
b. Corporate Veil 
 
Despite the principle of separate legal personality of a company the courts are often 
asked to ignore this principle. However, due to the separate legal personality principle 
of companies it is said that a veil exists between a company and its participants. 
Occasionally the courts will adopt ‗lifting the veil‘. What this effectively does is treat 
one or more of the company‘s participants and the company as one and the same person. 
Creditors who want participants such as shareholders or directors held personally liable 
for the company‘s debt may invoke veil piercing remedies.  
 
However, there is no simple principle that the courts have adopted. 
Incorporation does not fully ―cast a veil of a limited liability company through which 
the courts cannot see‖238, but generally, the court is more likely to ‗lift the veil‘ if fraud 
existed at inception. By looking through the veil of incorporation the Court is able to 
discover the person (s) in control and impose liability on them.  
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B. Companies Act 1993  
 
If a person in a fiduciary position breaches his fiduciary duties the law usually attracts 
‗strict liability‘ to such persons (e.g. trustees, directors, etc). The Companies Act 1993 
imposes many obligations on directors and these are found throughout the Act
239
. A 
breach of any one of these provisions may result in civil and possibly criminal liability. 
However, this dissertation is only concerned with section 135, 136 and 301
240
. Breaches 
of both section 135
241
 and section 136
242
 can give rise to a personal liability for directors 
via the remedy provided for in section 301
243
.   
 
 However, in order to hold director personally liable for the company‘s debt the 
director must have allowed the company to trade while being insolvent. Insolvency 
involves a two pronged test - where a company is unable to pay its debts as they become 
due (cash flow) or the liabilities exceed it assets (balance sheet). These two tests were 
imported from Australia – section 588G244(cash flow) and England – section 214245 
(balance sheet). 
 
 Section 4
246
 defines solvency as: 
 
Meaning of ``solvency test''--- (1) For the purposes of this Act, a company 
satisfies the solvency test if--- 
 (a) The company is able to pay its debts as they become due in the          
normal course of business; and 
 (b) The value of the company's assets is greater than the value of its         
liabilities, including contingent liabilities. 
 
 In Mountfort v Tasman Pacific Airlines of NZ Limited
247
 Baragwanath J stated at 
paragraph 20-21: 
 
―I am satisfied that the ―general obligation…to maintain the company‘s 
capital‖…has now been superseded by what may be expressed as a general 
albeit imperfect obligation not to trade while insolvent, which is to be 
inferred from the whole scheme of the Act. The obligation to maintain 
solvency could not be absolute, because that would destroy the very 
justification for limited liability which requires the protection of directors 
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who, acting reasonably and in good faith, are unable to prevent failure that is 
both a regular fact of business life and the justification for limited liability. 
The obligation is imperfect breach does not, per se, attract legal 
consequences for the directors. But it is nevertheless an obligation because it 
is the premise on which there is unconditional entitlement to continue to 
trade. 
Such conclusion is consistent with the explicit obligations now stated in ss 
…135 (not to allow substantial risk of serious), 136 (need for belief on 
reasonable grounds in ability to perform obligations)…are mandatory‖ 
 
Baragwanath J went on to hold that where a company is insolvent (i.e. unable to 
pay debts on due date or liabilities exceed assets) then the directors have a duty to place 
the company in liquidation in order to avoid further risk/prejudice to creditors of the 
company. 
 
a. Section 135
248
 – Reckless Trading 
 
135. Reckless trading---A director of a company must not--- 
   (a) Agree to the business of the company being carried on in a manner 
         likely to create a substantial risk of serious loss to the 
         company's creditors; or 
   (b) Cause or allow the business of the company to be carried on in a 
         manner likely to create a substantial risk of serious loss to 
         the company's creditors. 
 
 Section 135
249
 sets out an objective test for reckless trading and can potentially 
create a liability for directors before insolvency. This wide application perhaps acts as a 
deterrent for directors, although the Courts have been very cautious about applying this 
section to companies which are not insolvent or not near insolvency. 
 
 In order for this provision to be invoked there needs to be a ―substantial risk‖ or 
―serious loss‖. In Re Wait Investments Ltd (in liq.); McCallum & Petterson v Webster250 
the courts held that there must be something in the financial position of the company 
that would have put an ordinary prudent director on notice to the likelihood that 
entering into the transaction would cause a serious loss (more than minor or 
insignificant) to the company‘s creditors. Even though this case related to section 320251 
it has similar language to the present section 135
252
 which suggests that the approach 
taken by the courts are equally valid to the present provision. 
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 In Nippon Express (NZ) Ltd v Woodward
253
, an unsecured creditor brought a 
reckless trading action against two directors of the liquidated company. The Court held 
the directors were liable on the basis that they failed to make proper inquiry into the 
state of the business. They simply relied on the dishonest advice of the managing 
director. This was despite of the fact that both directors also suffered personal financial 
loss due to the managing director‘s fraudulent actions. 
 
 In Re Gellert Developments Ltd (in liq.); McCullagh v Gellert
254
 directors were 
held to be in breach of their duties to creditors by authorising payments of excessive 
salaries to themselves during a period when the company was facing insolvency. It was 
an attempt by the directors to strip the assets of the company. If the CIR had been a 
creditor in this case, it may have been a suitable case to apply section HK11.
255
  
 
Based on the case law surrounding the application of section 135
256
, it is clear 
that a court will not recognise a liability without applying the objective standard of a 
―reasonable, prudent director‖ and the company needs to be experiencing or exposed to 
financial difficulties. This sets the parameters for when a creditor can take action under 
section 135
257
.  
 
Interestingly, there are no reported cases on section 135
258
 involving the CIR as 
a creditor of an insolvent company. Why is this?  It could be a reluctance to use 
Companies Act remedies, or a preference for other avenues of recovery. Given the 
growth of complex debt over the last few years my view is the former. The other reason 
why I think the former is a good choice is due to recent efforts by IRD to rid itself of its 
past poor public image. However, this strategy could prove detrimental to maintaining 
the integrity of the tax system. 
 
But, it must be remembered that the awards made by the Court depend on the 
practicalities in each case. If the CIR is the only creditor in the liquidation then the court 
would most likely award directly to the CIR, if the CIR is the plaintiff who took the 
action where the liquidator was negligent/intransigent/conflicted etc. Nevertheless, the 
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CIR ought to use the full force of the law when warranted. This would protect the 
integrity of the tax system as well as promote voluntary compliance. 
 
b. Section 136 – Duty in Relation to Obligations 
 
136. Duty in relation to obligations---A director of a company must 
 not agree to the company incurring an obligation unless the director 
 believes at that time on reasonable grounds that the company will be 
 able to perform the obligation when it is required to do so. 
 
This provision prohibits a director from agreeing to a company incurring an 
obligation unless the director reasonably believes that the company will be able to fulfil 
its obligation as and when required. This provision is often invoked alongside section 
135
259
. 
 
In Fatupaito v Bates
260
 the court found that section 136
261
 comprises both an 
objective and subjective test. This case concerned the appointment of the company‘s 
accountant as receiver when the company was in financial difficulty. The company was 
allowed to continue trading but then went into liquidation. O‘ Reagan J held that the 
accountant knew the company was insolvent and therefore it was not reasonable for him 
to believe that the obligation incurred by the company would be met.  
 
In order to demonstrate a breach of this provision, a liquidator must show that 
the director agreed to the company incurring an obligation at a time when the director 
did not believe on reasonable grounds that the company would be able to perform that 
obligation when required to do so. The subjective test is the ―belief of the directors‖ and 
the objective test is that the ―belief‖ must be on ―reasonable grounds‖. 
 
In Re Hilltop Group Limited (in liq.); Lawrence v Jacobson
262
 a director was 
found to be in breach of section 136
263
 because he had transferred the business with an 
inflated goodwill value at a time when he knew the company was in decline and had 
lost a major customer. The Court applied the test of a reasonable prudent director and 
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concluded that a reasonable prudent director in a similar position would not have 
allowed the business to be carried on to continue to incur obligations while insolvent. 
 
In Walker v Allen
264
 excise duty for the purchase of alcohol was owed by the 
company to the New Zealand Customs. The excise duty remained unpaid for a 
significant period which prompted the New Zealand Customs to commence liquidation 
proceedings. This debt led to legal action being taken against the director.  The Court 
held that the action of the managing director went beyond any legitimate business risk 
which comprised of taking illegitimate business risks. Furthermore, the shortcoming of 
the director was also linked to failure to keep proper accounting records.
265
     
 
c. Section 301
266
 – Power of Court to Require Persons to Repay Money or Return 
Property 
 
301. Power of Court to require persons to repay money or return 
 property---(1) If, in the course of the liquidation of a company, it 
 appears to the Court that a person who has taken part in the formation 
 or promotion of the company, or a past or present director, manager, 
 liquidator, or receiver of the company, has misapplied, or retained, or 
 become liable or accountable for, money or property of the company, or 
 been guilty of negligence, default, or breach of duty or trust in 
 relation to the company, the Court may, on the application of the 
 liquidator or a creditor or shareholder,--- 
   (a) Inquire into the conduct of the promoter, director, manager, 
         liquidator, or receiver; and 
   (b) Order that person--- 
           (i) To repay or restore the money or property or any part of 
         it with interest at a rate the Court thinks just; or 
           (ii) To contribute such sum to the assets of the company by 
         way of compensation as the Court thinks just; or 
   (c) Where the application is made by a creditor, order that person to 
         pay or transfer the money or property or any part of it with 
         interest at a rate the Court thinks just to the creditor. 
 
   (2) This section has effect even though the conduct may constitute an 
 offence. 
 
   (3) An order for payment of money under this section is deemed to be a 
 final judgment within the meaning of section 19 (d) of the Insolvency 
 Act 1967. 
 
This section provides that on liquidation of the company, a present or past 
director who is guilty of breach of a company duty may be ordered to contribute an 
amount as determined by the Court to the assets of the company by way of 
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compensation. An application under this section can be either by a liquidator, 
shareholder or creditor of the company. This section is the instrument by which a 
creditor would seek to be recompensed by the director, if the creditor suffered a serious 
loss to which section 135 and section 136
267
 applied because neither of these sections 
themselves contains a remedy. 
 
In summary, while both section 135 and 136
268
 appear to present problems in 
interpretation and application due to the language used in each section, especially in 
relation to duties owed to creditors, the abundance of reported cases clarifies their 
application. This means that there is legal certainty, unlike the problems with 
interpretation that exist with section HK11
269
. However, there are some recurring 
themes evident in a number of the decisions on these sections. The duties owed to 
creditors created under these sections for directors, require the company to be near 
insolvency or insolvent. This requirement stems from the creditors position on 
insolvency given that that the company‘s assets are held for the benefit of creditors 
because the company is not in a positions to pay its debts. 
 
Another aspect of the directors duties created under section 135 and 136
270
 is 
that directors must also apply an objective test to meeting their obligations. In other 
words, there must be commercially viable reasons for their actions, taking into account 
the financial situation of the company and the potential loss to creditors as a result of 
their directives. 
 
C. Other Options 
 
a. Fair Trading Act 1986 [s45 (2)] 
 
45. Conduct by servants or agents---(1) Where, in proceedings under 
 this Part of this Act in respect of any conduct engaged in by a body 
 corporate, being conduct in relation to which any of the provisions of 
 this Act applies, it is necessary to establish the state of mind of the 
 body corporate, it is sufficient to show that a director, servant or 
 agent of the body corporate, acting within the scope of that person's 
 actual or apparent authority, had that state of mind. 
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   (2) Any conduct engaged in on behalf of a body corporate--- 
   (a) By a director, servant, or agent of the body corporate, acting 
         within the scope of that person's actual or apparent authority; 
         or 
   (b) By any other person at the direction or with the consent or 
         agreement (whether express or implied) of a director, servant, 
         or agent of the body corporate, given within the scope of the 
         actual or apparent authority of the director, servant or 
         agent--- 
 
 shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to have been engaged in 
 also by the body corporate. 
 
This provision makes it clear that both a company and the director of that 
company can be held liable for the same illegal conduct in relation to a breach under the 
legislation. The purpose of the legislation is to prevent misleading and deceptive 
conduct in business. 
 
In Rural Management Ltd v Commerce Commission
271
 the High Court held both 
the company and its director liable for misleading conduct in connection with the 
advertising of a subdivision, with the director being held liable as the principle offender. 
The Court held that the director knew that the statements the company were making in 
relation to the subdivision were false. 
 
In Ascot Travel Ltd v Brock
272
 the Court held that the director was personally 
liable for the forecast of the company‘s income. This income was misrepresented and 
misled the purchaser who fulfilled performance under the contract of sale. The 
company‘s income was part of the information for the sale of the business. Williams J 
said at p 18: 
 
―this is not a case where there is sufficient to displace the normal 
presumption that a director, making representations on behalf of a company 
for the sale of some of the company's assets, was acting in a manner which 
does not incur personal liability for the representations.‖ 
  
b. Commerce Act 1986 [s90] 
 
90. Conduct by servants or agents---(1) Where, in proceedings under 
 this Part of this Act in respect of any conduct engaged in by a body 
 corporate, being conduct in relation to which any of the provisions of 
 this Act applies, it is necessary to establish the state of mind of the 
 body corporate, it is sufficient to show that a director, servant or 
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 agent of the body corporate, acting within the scope of his actual or 
 apparent authority, had that state of mind. 
 
   (2) Any conduct engaged in on behalf of a body corporate--- 
   (a) By a director, servant, or agent of the body corporate, acting 
         within the scope of his actual or apparent authority: or 
   (b) By any other person at the direction or with the consent or 
         agreement (whether express or implied) of a director, servant, 
         or agent of the body corporate, given within the scope of the 
         actual or apparent authority of the director, servant or 
         agent--- 
 
 shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to have been engaged in 
 also by the body corporate. 
 
   (3) Where, in a proceeding under this Part of this Act in respect of 
 any conduct engaged in by a person other than a body corporate, being 
 conduct in relation to which a provision of this Act applies, it is 
 necessary to establish the state of mind of the person, it is sufficient 
 to show that a servant or agent of the person, acting within the scope 
 of his actual or apparent authority, had that state of mind. 
 
   (4) Any conduct engaged in on behalf of a person other than a body 
 corporate--- 
   (a) By a servant or agent of the person acting within the scope of his 
         actual or apparent authority; or 
   (b) By any other person at the direction or with the consent or 
         agreement (whether express or implied) of a servant or agent of 
         the first-mentioned person, given within the scope of the actual 
         or apparent authority of the servant or agent--- 
 
 shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to have been engaged in 
 also by the first-mentioned person. 
 
   (5) A reference in this section to the state of mind of a person 
 includes a reference to the knowledge, intention, opinion, belief or 
 purpose of the person and the person's reasons for that intention, 
 opinion, belief or purpose. 
 
This provision is another example of a statutory exception to the principle of 
separate legal personality. The purpose of this act is to promote competition.
273
 It 
recognises that if an offence requires proof of the state of mind of corporate entity, then 
it is sufficient to show the state of mind of a director, servant, or agent of that corporate 
entity. The conduct of a director, servant or agent of a corporate entity can be deemed to 
be conduct of that corporate entity in certain circumstances. 
 
In Giltrap City Ltd v Commerce Commission
274
 the Court of Appeal established 
that the Chief Executive Officer of a car-dealing company was held to have entered into 
price- fixing agreements on behalf of the company with other car-dealers. The actions of 
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the Chief Executive Officer were held to be both his own as well as those of the 
company and both were liable under section 90.
275
 
 
The above alternatives, similar to that of section HK11
276
 are where the 
legislature has provided for the statutory piercing of the corporate veil. They illustrate 
that the culpability of a company can extend to its agents and associated entities where 
their conduct and actions lead to a dispute. They require Courts to confer blame beyond 
the corporate personality. 
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VIII. OVERSEAS EXPERIENCE 
 
A. Australia 
 
When income tax becomes due in Australia, it is a debt owed to the Commonwealth of 
Australia
277
. Tax debt is a civil liability and failure to make payment of tax exposes the 
taxpayer to civil remedies. Unpaid tax may be sued for and recovered as a civil debt in 
any court for the recovery of unpaid tax
278
. Tax includes penalty tax
279
.  However, a 
criminal offence may be committed where arrangements are entered into with the 
purpose of rendering a company unable, or likely not to be able to pay tax. The 
intentional stripping of company‘s assets so that it is unable to pay its debts is a long 
standing problem in Australia, similar to that experienced in New Zealand.  
 
In the 1970s avoiding company tax was on the increase in Australia. This 
involved either stripping a company of its assets before tax became payable, or using 
another company which became liable for the tax liability but that company never had 
sufficient assets to pay the tax. This phenomenon became known as "bottom of the 
harbour" schemes because the records of the stripped companies were, metaphorically, 
retired to the bottom of Sydney Harbour once they had served their purpose. 
 
The growth of tax avoidance schemes in the 1970s was mass marketed. 
Strangely though the Courts at that time seem to have taken a lenient approach in 
regards to this phenomenon as witnessed in Curran v FC of T
280
and Slutzkin v FC of 
T
281
. These cases provide examples of the odd compassion tolerated by the courts which 
in many cases bordered on fraud. This only encouraged the massive frauds on the 
revenue and they flourished. 
 
A tax investigation in Perth identified a few cases where assets were being 
stripped from companies leaving the company unable to satisfy its tax liability. This 
sparked a wave of events that that ended up with the government taken action. It was 
uncertain whether these schemes constituted tax avoidance, minimisation or evasion. 
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The government‘s action resulted in the enactment of the Crimes (Taxation Offences) 
Act 1980. This Act imposed severe penal sanctions to counter arrangements designed to 
prevent tax being collected from companies and trustees. The legislation targeted 
"bottom of the harbour" arrangements. Unlike other anti-avoidance legislation, this Act 
was designed to penalise the avoidance of payment, rather than the avoidance of tax 
assessment. 
 
Under that Act it became a criminal offence for any person to make a company 
or trust unable to pay tax debts or to aid or abet any person or company doing so. The 
Act thus caught both, those in the schemes and the promoters of such schemes. This Act 
was controversial at the time, since tax avoidance was regarded as something less than 
an outright crime. Tax matters might normally be addressed by closing a revenue 
loophole, the act instead treated bottom of the harbour schemes like frauds.  
However, a person cannot be convicted of more than one offence under the Act 
in relation to the same arrangement or transaction. This ensures, for example, that a 
person who is a party to an arrangement designed to frustrate collection of tax and who 
also aids or abets someone else to enter the arrangement may be convicted of either 
offence, but not both.  
Australia then introduced the Taxation (Unpaid Company Tax) Assessment Act 
1982. This Act went further, allowing for the recovery of tax avoided under ―bottom of 
the harbour‖ tax schemes retrospectively.  
 
It is not clear why the Australian Tax Office did not apply section 588G
282
 or at 
least place pressure on liquidators to apply section 588G
283
 (i.e. insolvent trading which 
is akin to reckless trading) as this remedy could address the mischief but this remedy is 
apparently an underutilised remedy. It has not failed creditors; it has simply not been 
tested or tried. A reason may be that liquidators are reluctant to engage in civil litigation 
without funding for such actions.  
 
It is unclear whether the Australian Tax Office has conducted a proper 
investigation into the remedies available in the Corporations Act 2001 and considered 
why such remedies are not being adequately applied. ASIC (the Companies Regulator) 
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may also wish to participate in a research exercise to consider whether companies are 
being abused for tax evasion purposes. 
 
B. United Kingdom 
 
The most pertinent tax provision relating to personal liability for company tax seems to 
be sections 189 & 190
284
. These provisions give powers of recovery of unpaid 
corporation tax against a shareholder who has received a capital distribution from the 
company, where that capital derives from a disposal of assets.  The latter section gives 
rights of recovery against other group companies and controlling directors for unpaid 
corporation tax on gains realised by a UK resident company.  These seem to fit with the 
idea of protecting HM Revenue & Customs against 'asset stripping'. No information was 
able to be obtained on how these work and the fact that the experts were scratching their 
heads to find any provisions in the first place suggests they are of limited use. 
 
There are provisions in the Companies Acts 2006 which are the responsibility of 
BERR (Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform). However, the 
usual position is that the debt of the company is owed by the company and only the 
company.  Director‘s liabilities are contained under sections 212 to 216285.  These 
provisions provide that a negligent or fraudulent director can be made personally liable 
for the debts owed by the company.   
 
As an example, in England football is a very popular sport. This popularity grew 
to such an extent that it surpassed the notion of sport and entered the arena of business. 
This saw players being paid to play football. Football clubs then set up companies to 
limit liabilities of their directors. The Football Association recognised the danger this 
posed and introduced rules to prevent asset-stripping of grounds and the leaching of 
money as payments to directors. Sadly, these fears proved well-founded in recent years. 
This occurred in the case of the ex-Chairman of Bradford City Football Club. This case 
involved a tax scheme in which a group company was asset stripped leaving it insolvent 
and in debt. The Chairman was held to be in breach of his director‘s duty to that 
company.   
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Similarly, a director can be made liable in cases of ―phoenixism‖ for all the 
debts of his second company. ―Phoenixism‖ is used to describe the practice where 
directors carry on the same business or trade successively through a series of two or 
more companies. Each of the companies in turn becomes insolvent, leaving large unpaid 
tax debts. A company typically transfers its business, minus its debts, to the next 
company. Only essential trade creditors are paid in full before the transfer. Often taxes 
remain unpaid. ―Phoenixism‖ is the practice of liquidating a company to avoid paying 
off creditors and establishing the same firm under a new name shortly thereafter.  
 
There are also certain provisions of the PAYE legislation which allow for 
directions to be made against employees who knowingly receive emoluments without 
PAYE being directed.  In practice this only really bites on directors of small companies, 
and even then it can be hard to make stick.
286
 This case is a good example of the 
corporate veil operating in United Kingdom tax. 
 
Certain legislation
287
 under the Companies Act 2006 does ensure that liabilities 
stay within a group.  This is a form of imputing liability to shareholders and rests on the 
liability being unlikely to be paid.  Unfortunately, cases under this provision have yet to 
be heard. 
 
In 2005, measures aimed at tackling tax fraud and tax avoidance were 
announced. These measures were to protect the tax system from abuse and to ensure 
that an unfair burden does not fall on the vast majority of taxpayers who pay their taxes. 
Many of these measures have been informed by the disclosure rules introduced in 
Finance Act 2004, which allow HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) to identify and 
target specific risks to the tax system. The measure announced that may be relevant to 
this dissertation is the transfer of assets abroad. 
 
This remedy is to stop UK-resident individuals avoiding tax by exploiting 
offshore companies and trusts. Changes to the transfer of assets abroad legislation will 
tighten the rules for exemption from liability and close loopholes. 
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In summary, in the United Kingdom: - if a company is insolvent and it seems that 
the Revenue‘s claims will not be paid in full, there are recovery measures which seek to 
recover the debt from another person. The Revenue‘s rights to collect the company‘s 
debt from third parties are:  
 the collection of capital gains tax from a trustee, done or debtor‘s spouse; 
 corporate tax from members in a group of companies or shareholders or others 
who have received distribution of capital following a sale of property; 
 The recovery of PAYE from employees (usually directors of a company) 288 
 
While there appears to be some provisions, available for HM Revenue & Customs it is 
of limited use. It was very difficult to find cases law on its application and consultation 
with experts in the UK via email proved it limited use. It would appear that the 
preference would be for Companies Act remedies. 
 
C. Canada 
 
Canada also does not have a specific provision in its Income Tax Act that deals with 
asset ―stripping arrangements‖ such as that found in New Zealand or the ―bottom of the 
harbour‖ schemes found in Australia. However, any taxes, interest and other amounts 
payable under the Acts are debts due to Her Majesty and recoverable as such in court or 
in any other manner provided by the Acts. 
 
Even though no specific provision exists in the Income Tax Act in Canada the 
Commissioner has many provisions spread across the Revenue Acts that can assist to 
remedy any abuse or mischief by delinquent directors. There are other provisions such 
as section 325
289
 which hold a purchaser liable for company tax where a person sells 
some or all of it assets at less than fair market value. This provision tends to target 
mainly transactions between associated parties. It is unlikely that this provision will 
help with collecting unpaid company taxes due to ―asset stripping‖ arrangements. 
 
However, the tax evasion provisions contained within the Income Tax Act 
appears to have the ability to attack ―asset stripping‖ arrangements. While no judicial 
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evidence has been obtained to confirm this assertion, reading the provision shows no 
reason why this cannot be utilised. The pertinent part of the provision reads: 
 
―(1) Every person who has…(d) wilfully, in any manner, evaded or attempted 
to evade compliance with this Act or payment of taxes imposed by this 
Act,…is guilty of an offence and, in addition to any penalty otherwise 
provided, is liable on summary conviction to 
(f) a fine of not less than 50%, and not more than 200%, of the amount of the 
tax that was sought to be evaded, or 
(g) both the fine described in paragraph 239(1) (f) and imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding 2 years.‖290 
  
The problem with this provision is that it is not clear as who the ―person‖ being 
referred to is. It can only be assumed that because a company is an artificial person it 
must refer to the controlling mind of the company. But this then calls into question the 
separate legal personality and corporate veil issue. So while this provision exists, I am 
not convinced that it achieves the outcome intended by section HK11
291
. 
 
More compelling provisions within the Revenue Acts are those referred to as 
―Directors‘ Liability‖ provisions. The basic rules of liability are that the Canada 
Revenue Agency (―CRA‖) must demonstrate its inability to recover amounts directly 
from the company and proceedings against the directors began within two years of the 
director ceasing to be a director. However, a defence is that the director can show that 
they exercised the degree of care, diligence and skill (―due diligence‖) required to 
prevent failure. The provisions are:  
 
Income Tax Act 
227.1 (1) Where a corporation has failed to deduct or withhold an amount as 
required by subsection 135(3) or 135.1(7) or section 153 or 215, has failed to 
remit such an amount or has failed to pay an amount of tax for a taxation year 
as required under Part VII or VIII, the directors of the corporation at the time 
the corporation was required to deduct, withhold, remit or pay the amount are 
jointly and severally, or solidarily, liable, together with the corporation, to 
pay that amount and any interest or penalties relating to it. 
 
Excise Tax Act 
323. (1) If a corporation fails to remit an amount of net tax as required under 
subsection 228(2) or (2.3) or to pay an amount as required under section 
230.1 that was paid to, or was applied to the liability of, the corporation as a 
net tax refund, the directors of the corporation at the time the corporation was 
required to remit or pay, as the case may be, the amount are jointly and 
severally, or solidarily, liable, together with the corporation, to pay the 
amount and any interest on, or penalties relating to, the amount. 
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A common scenario in creating director‘s liability in Canada is when a business 
is in financial difficulty and it uses taxes collected to continue trading rather than 
ceasing. However, when the company realises that these funds are insufficient to 
continue trading, the company goes out of business. CRA has a statutory right to go 
after the directors.  
 
The purpose and scope of these provisions was considered in Smith v R.
292
. The 
directors‘ liability provisions were enacted to strengthen the Crown‘s ability to enforce 
statutory obligation imposed on certain taxpayers. Normally the Crown‘s remedies 
against a company that fails would be limited to the company‘s assets. This is as a result 
of the separate corporate personality 
 
It was perceived that a company in financial difficulty might default in its tax 
payment obligations in preference to its more immediate needs. It was then seen as 
necessary to deter companies from making these choices. Consequently, section 
227.1
293
 and section 323
294
 were enacted to impose liability, subject to certain 
conditions, on the directors of the company that failed in its tax payment obligations. 
But this is based on the assumption that the decision of the company to default on its tax 
payment obligations originated from the directors. 
 
In Soper v The Queen
295
 it was found that in 1981-82 the company, faced with a 
choice of paying taxes to the Crown or paying key creditors, whose goods and services 
were necessary to continue operation of the business, the directors chose the latter 
action.  This abuse and mismanagement on the part of directors constituted the 
―mischief‖ at which section 227.1296 was directed 
 
While this research has found no equivalent provision to section HK11
297
 with 
the Canadian tax legislation, it is obvious that the Commissioner of CRA has the ability 
to deal with the mischief of ―asset stripping‖.  
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D. Summary 
 
The above overseas jurisdictions do not have specific provisions within the Revenue 
Acts that allow the Commissioner to penetrate the corporate veil of the company to 
impute liability onto directors and shareholders for tax debt. These jurisdictions rely on 
the Companies Act and Insolvency Act remedies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 75 
IX. TAXATION RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
A. Tax Policy & Administration 
 
Tax administration is fundamental to the functioning of the economy. Its role is to 
ensure that it collects sufficient revenue to meet Government‘s expenditure objectives 
and also to obtain a surplus in the budget. Underpinning these objectives is the policy of 
ensuring that the manner in which the tax system achieves this is both efficient and 
simple. The New Zealand government strives for a robust tax system comprising both 
tax law and tax administration.
298
 This is achieved through the care and management 
provisions of the Tax Administration Act 1994. Care and management helps maintain 
the integrity of the tax system. 
 
Tax policy plays an important role in supporting government‘s goal of fostering 
an environment of economic growth. In order to achieve economic growth, a country 
must have an effective and efficient tax system.
299
 The tax system does not only need to 
be efficient and effective but simple as well. The most critical aspect of the tax system 
is the manner in which it is administered. If the system is administered poorly then 
widespread abuse will reign and its integrity will be undermined. Therefore 
administering the tax system in an effective and efficient manner will ensure that a 
robust tax system exists.  
 
The strategy adopted by the administrator (CIR) to achieve this is by 
encouraging voluntary compliance. Voluntary compliance is a system whereby 
taxpayers meet all or most of their tax obligations with the intervention of the 
administrator. This is the same strategy adopted by tax administrators in other 
jurisdictions such as the Australian Tax Office, United Kingdom Board of Internal 
Revenue, Revenue Canada and United States Internal Revenue Services. In New 
Zealand the system appears to be both cost effective and efficient. However, this is only 
established once a full audit is undertaken because this proves the honesty or otherwise 
of the taxpayer.  Past research has shown that the vast majority of taxpayers do comply 
                                                 
298
 http://executive.govt.nz/96-99/compliance/index.html Part II, Robustness Against Avoidance and 
Evasion 
299
 Inland Revenue, Corporate Insolvency-Taxation Risk Management, speech by CIR, David Butler at 
the New Zealand Law Society taxation conference on the 6 September 2006, Auckland 
 76 
with their tax obligations.  Given the economic growth of the foreign jurisdictions 
above, this system would be effective there as well. 
 
In New Zealand, the CIR in performing his duties of administering an efficient 
and effective tax system operates with limited resources. As a result there are times 
when choices have to be made about the best use of these resources. Although the 
primary duty of the CIR is to collect taxes he is constrained by the limited number of 
resources available to fulfil his duties.  As a result the legislators have allowed the CIR 
discretionary powers under section 6
300
 and 6A
301
. These provisions allow the CIR to 
prioritise his duties depending on the availability of resources. 
 
6(1) [Ministers and officials to protect integrity of tax system]  
Every Minister and every officer of any government agency having 
responsibilities under this Act or any other Act in relation to the collection of 
taxes and other functions under the Inland Revenue Acts are at all times to 
use their best endeavours to protect the integrity of the tax system.  
 
6A (2) [Care and management of taxes]  
The Commissioner is charged with the care and management of the taxes 
covered by the Inland Revenue Acts and with such other functions as may be 
conferred on the Commissioner.  
6A (3) [Collection of taxes]  
In collecting the taxes committed to the Commissioner's charge, and 
notwithstanding anything in the Inland Revenue Acts, it is the duty of the 
Commissioner to collect over time the highest net revenue that is practicable 
within the law having regard to—  
(a) The resources available to the Commissioner; and 
(b) The importance of promoting compliance, especially voluntary 
compliance, by all taxpayers with the Inland Revenue Acts; and 
(c) The compliance costs incurred by taxpayers.  
 
Furthermore, it must be remembered that even though the CIR is tasked with the 
duty to collect revenue this is not an absolute duty. This means that the CIR is not 
expected to collect all tax that is owed by every taxpayer. He is however expected to 
collect the highest net revenue over time while protecting the integrity of the tax 
system.
302
 
 
176(1) [Commissioner must maximise recovery of outstanding tax]  
The Commissioner must maximise the recovery of outstanding tax from a 
taxpayer.  
176(2) [Situations where Commissioner may not recover outstanding 
tax]  
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Despite subsection (1), the Commissioner may not recover outstanding tax to 
the extent that—  
(a) Recovery is an inefficient use of the Commissioner's resources; or 
(b) Recovery would place a taxpayer, being a natural person, in serious 
hardship. 
 
The duty of the CIR to collect the highest net revenue over time is often 
challenged by taxpayers. But the CIR‘s duties are not absolute. In recent times a number 
of cases heard in Court called in question the duties of the CIR. 
 
In Fairbrother v CIR
303
 the issue was whether the CIR could enter into an 
agreement with a taxpayer to collect less than the full amount of tax owing if specific 
remission and relief provisions did not apply. Young J was of the view that the CIR was 
not under a statutory obligation to collect the correct amount of tax and stated: 
 
―…the legislation under consideration by the house of Lords provided that 
income tax should be ‗under the care and management of the 
Commissioners‘.  There was, however no express statutory provision 
comparable to the duty now imposed by section 6A on the Commissioner in 
New Zealand ‗to collect over time the highest net revenue practicable with 
the law‘. Yet the phrase ‗care and management‘ was construed as, in effect, 
imposing such a duty on the Commissioners.‖ 
 
 This case determined that it is possible for the CIR to collect less tax than is 
owed for debt collection purposes as long as it does not contravene an express statutory 
provision. 
 
 In Raynel v CIR
304
 the issue was whether the CIR was bound to accept a 
proposed compromise rather than pursue bankruptcy proceedings given less tax would 
be recovered under the latter action. Randerson J held that the duty to maximise tax was 
not an absolute one. Accordingly, the CIR was not obliged to accept a compromise 
where the integrity of the tax system would be served by pursuing legal action. 
 
These cases confirm that the Court is unable to look behind the CIR‘s use of his 
statutory discretion as it relates to the care and management of taxes. 
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B. Tax Compliance 
 
The preference of the CIR in collecting taxes is not litigation but for taxpayers to pay on 
their own accord. Hence the CIR promotes voluntary compliance rather than resorting 
to unnecessary utilisation of limited resources. 
 
Encouraging voluntary compliance involves making it easy for those who want 
to comply and at the same time making it very difficult for those who choose not to 
comply. Those who do not want to comply are also brought to account in an appropriate 
manner.  
 
It is very important that the tax system is seen as fair and consistent otherwise 
voluntary compliance will be undermined.  Debt collection activities allow the CIR to 
influence and maintain community confidence, through tailoring enforcement activities 
that reflect the consequences of non-compliance. 
 
The Compliance Model 
 
In order to ensure that the CIR operates in the most transparent way possible 
while ensuring that no class of taxpayers is unnecessarily prejudiced, the CIR utilises a 
compliance model. The compliance model is a framework that helps the CIR to 
understand those factors that influence taxpayer compliance behaviour. By 
understanding the factors that influence taxpayer compliance behaviour appropriate 
action(s) are taken to change that behaviour. The compliance model helps the CIR to 
tailor his management of taxpayers effectively with a fair and consistent approach. 
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The compliance model is as follows: 
 
305 
 
 
David Butler, Commissioner of Inland Revenue stated
306
: 
 
―In applying the model we will: 
 [A]appropriately enforce the law to help move customers who have 
decided not to comply to a position where they are likely to do so in 
future‖ 
 
The compliance model is used to assess where a taxpayer is situated on the 
compliance triangle having taken all factors that influence his behaviour. By identifying 
the type of taxpayer behaviour the CIR is able to ensure the most effective remedy is 
selected to change that behaviour. It also ensures that the most cost effective remedy is 
utilised thereby maximising the use of the CIR‘s resources. 
 
The strategy is both simple and efficient. Taxpayer confidence in the integrity of 
the tax system is ensured. This system is also utilised in Australia. But is ‗voluntary 
compliance‘ really voluntary? Surely taxpayers are fully aware that if they fail to 
comply they will face the legal repercussion of non compliance, especially if they are 
situated at the top of the compliance model triangle. How then can it be said that the 
system is based on voluntary compliance? It is not different from any other mandatory 
law such as criminal law. People behave as the law requires because if they transgress 
from the law, there are consequences. Taxpayers are likely to engage in a ―cost benefit‖ 
analysis when deciding whether or not to comply.   
                                                 
305
 http://www.ato.gov.au/corporate/content.asp?doc=/content/5704.htm 
306
 In a speech, on Corporate Insolvency – Taxation Risk Management at the New Zealand Law Society 
Taxation Conference,  6 September 2006, Auckland  
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C. Suggested Reform for Section HK11 
 
a. The Tax Avoidance Issue 
 
The 1988 Government Report on tax Compliance,
307
 by the Committee of Experts 
expressed concern over the apparent tension between the requirements of subsection 
(1)(c)(i) and (1)(c)(ii)
308
. The committee stated that since the purpose of the 
arrangement was that the company was unable to satisfy its liability for tax, this 
amounted to tax avoidance.  
 
The committee stated at paragraph 11.50 -11.51 that;
309
 
 
The requirement in subsection (1) (c) (ii), that a purpose of the arrangement 
was to have the effect of tax avoidance, make the tax recovery provision too 
difficult to apply because it requires the Commissioner to show subjective 
intent. A court would be unlikely in all but the most blatant circumstance to 
include that a purpose of the impugned arrangement was to avoid payment of 
tax. This purpose would have to be foreseen and intended consequences or a 
goal of the arrangement. 
 
In addition, the second limb of paragraph (c) seems to frustrate the objective 
comment of the first limb, which sets out the test of a director who made all 
reasonable enquiries into the company‘s affairs and what he or she would 
have anticipated as likely. This first limb seems to be designed to target 
recklessness, negligence or oversight on the director‘s part. However, if the 
directors have not made all reasonable enquiries, and therefore do not know 
of the looming tax liability, how can they be said to have a purpose of 
avoiding tax under subsection (1) (c) (ii)? It follows that the second limb 
would always rule out recklessness, negligence, or oversight. 
 
The committee recommended in its report that the Government amend section 
HK11
310
 to make the recovery provisions more effective by changing the requirements 
to an avoidance purpose so that it is an alternate requirement only. The committee 
believed that amendment was consistent with the policy intent of the tax recovery 
provision making the requirement for reasonable enquiries by a director the main test 
for the provision.
311
 
                                                 
307
 Report to the Treasurer and Minister of revenue by Committee of experts on Tax Compliance 
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308
 Section HK11 Income Tax Act 1994 
309
 Report to the Treasurer and Minister of revenue by Committee of experts on Tax Compliance 
December 1998 
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 Income tax Act 1994 
311
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To date, no such amendment has been made. Even though the Income tax Act 
has now been rewritten this part of the provision remains largely untouched. This can 
only mean that officials believe that HK11
312
 in its current form meets the required 
policy intent. Given that there are no cases which have addressed the substantive 
requirements of the application of the provision, it is difficult to agree or disagree with 
that position.  
 
But it does beg the question of why the CIR is not using this particular recovery 
provision more. Given the increase in the level of difficult debt reported by Inland 
Revenue, it cannot be due to the lack of potentially suitable cases. Is it a lack of training 
of IRD solicitors, a lack of political willpower by IRD management, a lack of resources 
(e.g. investigators, litigators, funds for briefing Crown solicitors, etc) or a lack of 
awareness of the issue?      
 
b. The Active Director Issue 
 
The defence for directors is that they will not be liable if the CIR is satisfied that they 
derived no benefit from the arrangement and have either dissented from the 
arrangement
313
 and notified the CIR of the arrangement and their dissent
314
, or they 
prove to the CIR that they were not involved in the executive management of the 
company at the relevant time (s)
315
 and they had little or no knowledge of the 
arrangement.
316
 
 
It is difficult to understand how the ―executive management‖ defence will work 
in practice. To begin with, directors who notify the CIR, expose themselves, and/or 
other directors and shareholders, to an enquiry under section HK11
317
. Considering the 
wide ranging powers of the CIR and the intrusiveness of an IRD audit it is unlikely to 
be effective to have the director opting for this approach. This defence would appear to 
be ineffective and therefore would fail to promote voluntary compliance.  
 
                                                 
312
 Income Tax Act 2004 
313
 Section HK11(6)(a)(i) Income Tax Act 2004 
314
 Section HK11(6)(a)(ii) Income Tax Act 2004 
315
 Section HK11(6)(b)(i) Income Tax Act 2004 
316
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Furthermore, there is no guidance on what constitutes ―executive management‖ 
because the term ―executive‖ is not defined in the Income Tax Act 2004. The 
dictionary
318
meaning is as follows: 
 
a person or group responsible for the administration of a project, activity or 
business 
 
The term ―execute‖ and ―management‖ are defined as follows: 
 
execute…5 to carry into effect (a judicial sentence..)‖ 
―management…1 the members of the executive or administration of an 
organisation or business 3 the technique, practice, or science of managing, 
controlling or dealing with… 
 
The dictionary meaning of executive denotes more of an administrative rather 
than control function, this usually denotes senior management. Therefore ―executive 
management‖ extends beyond simple administration to making decisions necessary to 
carry into effect the plans and policy of the company. It means active management in 
executing the company affairs, although not necessarily on a day to day basis, and 
certainly implementing decisions made at the board level requiring an involvement with 
the day to day affairs 
 
Although there is no case law on the term ―executive management‖, the case law 
concerning company residency has looked in detail at the terms ―administrative 
management‖ and ―centre of management‖. However, these terms are different and 
have been applied in a different context. Consideration must be given to the 
involvement and participation rather than the position held by the director. A good 
analogy, even though frivolous, of involvement and participation is “likened to that of a 
bacon and egg breakfast. The chicken is involved, whereas the pig is a participant‖.319  
 
The premise that executive management must extend beyond basic 
administration to both an active involvement and participation is a logical approach 
otherwise the policy intent of section HK11
320
 would be frustrated as it would target a 
much wider class of directors than intended. It makes sense for the term to mean active 
management which entails decision making into the day to day affairs of the company. 
                                                 
318
 Collins English Dictionary, Complete & unabridged, New Edition 
319
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320
 Income tax Act 2004 
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This meaning needs to either be contained within the definitions of this provision or in 
an operational statement. This clarification will help improve the efficiency of the tax 
system. 
 
c. The Liquidation Issue 
 
In applying section HK11
321
, the CIR may issue an assessment or an amended tax 
assessment in relation to a liquidated company, subject to the four year time bar period, 
as if the company had not been issued with an assessment or amended assessment.
322
If 
the CIR is applying this provision to directors of a liquidated company, the CIR must 
nominate the person or persons whom the CIR considers liable for the tax liability and 
those persons are treated as agents of the liquidated company for the purposes of this tax 
liability.
323
 
 
 When the CIR seeks to invoke section HK11
324
, the status of a liquidated 
company is a contentious one. This is so due to the tension between the liquidator‘s 
duties
325
 and his right to object to the application of section HK11
326
. The decision in 
Spencer & Anor v CIR
327
  has made the CIR gun-shy concerning the use of section 
HK11
328
as a recovery provision. 
 
 In relation to the care and management provisions
329
, it is an ineffective use of 
resources if the application of section HK11
330
 fails for procedural reasons. The CIR has 
an overriding obligation to acknowledge the rights of taxpayers including taxpayers 
who are deemed agents of other taxpayers who have a tax liability. The CIR should 
issue a standard practice statement advising how he intends to approach the application 
of section HK11
331
.      
 
                                                 
321
 Ibid 
322
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d. The Objection Issue 
 
Section HK11
332
 should be a disputable decision and the disputes process should be an 
option to the taxpayer.
333
 However, in practice the CIR has used section HK11
334
 and 
advised defence council that the only recourse for defending such claims is Judicial 
Review in the High Court. 
  
 Under the current construction of section HK11
335
, David Snelling, author of 
“Difficulties in disputing the application of s HK11” agrees that the CIR can apply the 
provision in this manner. This means that the taxpayer cannot issue a Notice of 
Proposed Adjustment to the CIR but may respond via Judicial Review.  
 
 However, the author does state that legislative amendment is required since tax 
administration is not meant to close the door of the disputes process to taxpayers and 
force them to resort to costly High Court litigation. Statutory interpretation is an issue 
and the author is accepting that the CIR can apply section HK11
336
 as is but that 
legislative amendment would provide clarity. 
 
 The author‘s argument may be justified given that the CIR the power and 
delegation to proceed with the current provision as is. But the fact that the "taxman" 
isn't every taxpayer‘s favourite creditor may result in lobbying for a cost-efficient way 
of disputing tax liability if such a case proceeded. Tax practitioners also have a vested 
interest in preferring the more user friendly disputes process. 
 
 The outlook for HK11
337
 is uncertain. The CIR can legally rely on the recovery 
provision in its current form, from a policy perspective of preventing the erosion of the 
tax base. But, is it advisable to do so? Or is this at odds with the spirit, purpose and 
goals of the disputes process and more importantly the Inland Revenue Charter? 
Personally, I think the latter. 
 
                                                 
332
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333
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X. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
As creditor of a liquidated company the CIR needs to consider his ability to recover 
unpaid tax. He may consider actions under sections 135
338
 and 136
339
.  When a judge 
issues a decision on perhaps reckless trading, the judge has to maintain the integrity of 
the jurisprudence of corporate law and is bound to do so. This implies that the judge 
wouldn't discriminate against the CIR as a unique status creditor/plaintiff in a corporate 
litigation matter. This is what already occurs in non-tax remedy matters such as 
common law remedies like Mareva injunctions. 
 
 Section HK11
340
 provides an alternative route of recovery of unpaid tax from 
those involved with the liquidated company. This provision is one of several statutory 
exceptions to the separate legal personality for a company. It is intended to be used to 
recover outstanding tax debts in certain circumstances from a director of a company 
when the company is unable to satisfy it tax liability. 
 
 It is a recovery provision seldom used by the CIR. In pursuing this course of 
action the CIR must establish that the company has been stripped of its assets thereby 
leaving it with the inability to satisfy its tax liability. The focus of enquiry by the CIR is 
to establish that this has occurred through an arrangement which the potentially liable 
directors/shareholders had knowledge of or involvement in. The consequence or effect 
of that arrangement is that the company is unable to pay it tax. The CIR must then link 
the role played by the director with that of the arrangement. A director‘s liability 
depends on his/her level of involvement in the arrangement. 
 
 Section HK11
341
 should be considered as an alternate recovery action for the 
CIR when the facts of the case support its application, notwithstanding that the 
Companies Act 1993 remedies are also available.  With much uncertainty and little 
judicial guidance on the application of this provision, the CIR should be seeking a test 
case to allow the Courts to consider the thresholds required for its successful 
application. Or write a public binding ruling. 
 
                                                 
338
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339
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 The CIR should not be resisting the use of this section given its potential to 
maximise tax recoveries in cases where recovery would be minimal or nil. This would 
also support the care and management duty of the CIR and enhance the integrity of the 
New Zealand tax system.  
 
 If the CIR is not prepared to make use of this provision then the only logical 
alternative is to have it removed altogether. After all, this would not be detrimental to 
tax law in New Zealand. As we have seen in other bigger, more efficient economic 
jurisdictions there is no need for a specific provision such as HK11
342
. These 
jurisdictions are still able to efficiently administer the tax system without compromising 
its integrity.  This is despite the fact that these jurisdictions have more company 
taxpayers and more complex structures to contend with. 
 
Why must the CIR reinvent the wheel to recover debt from a delinquent debtor? 
The CIR should get in line with other creditors and use proven remedies. This would 
optimise the use of limited resources as well as send a strong message to those in 
control of defunct companies. It will uphold the integrity of the tax system as a whole. 
Here are some reasons why commercial remedies (e.g. Companies Act 1993, Fair 
Trading Act 1986, etc.) ought to be preferred: 
  
 HK11343 is beset by legal uncertainty regarding the nature, substance 
and process for applying it. There is confusion and fundamental 
differences of opinion about whether HK11
344
 is a recovery or 
assessment provision. If Inland Revenue is itself divided on the 
nature of this remedy and its proper application, how are taxpayers 
expected to understand it? 
 
 Companies Act 1993 remedies are in line with the imperative for 
legal harmonisation with our nations trading partners whereas 
section HK11
345
 is unique. First, it is better for foreign directors and 
investors to understand their legal obligations and risk than to have 
peculiar remedies which are domestically unique. Second, the CIR 
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343
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will benefit from the international legal developments on Companies 
Act 1993 remedies (under comparable corporate law) whereas with 
section HK11
346
 the CIR stands alone bearing the burden and cost of 
developing the law on section HK11
347
 remedy. Other countries 
have already used similar remedies (reckless or fraudulent trading) 
to recover debts for the Crown thus these remedies accord with best 
practice. 
 
 At least one other government department in New Zealand (NZ 
Customs) has used Companies Act 1993 remedies with great 
success. This trailblazing has proven domestically that Companies 
Act 1993 remedies have great efficacy for collecting Crown debts. 
With section HK11
348
 the CIR stands alone among public 
departments in using this remedy and developing the law for Crown 
tax debt recovery.  
 
 If the CIR were to assist in developing and using Companies act 
1993 remedies this would have benefit for other domestic creditors - 
both public and private – thus strengthening the domestic legal 
environment and economy; 
 
 Companies Act 1993 remedies minimise risk since multiple claims 
may be included in the same action thus affording the plaintiff better 
odds of success, whereas section HK11
349
 is a "one shot" or one 
claim/cause of action option; 
 
 Companies Act 1993 remedies target multiple goals (e.g. debt 
recovery; risk management via court banning; etc) whereas section 
HK11
350
 only targets debt recovery; 
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 Companies Act 1993 remedies cover a very broad array of mischief 
or unlawful behaviour (e.g. failure to keep accounting records; 
failure to file tax returns; voidable preferences; etc) whereas section 
HK11
351
 only targets a narrow field of mischief (i.e. asset-stripping 
or phoenixing). 
 
 The Inland Revenue employs solicitors who generally bring with 
them experience using commercial remedies (e.g. Companies Act 
1993 claims, Fair Trading Act 1986, torts, etc.) whereas section 
HK11
352
 litigation experience is something unique to the Inland 
Revenue and which each new solicitor would have to learn at the 
Inland Revenue. 
  
The advantage which the CIR obtains from using non-tax remedies is avoiding 
the hypersensitive tax policy issues and complications of the tax realm. At a policy 
level, taxpayers could respond by arguing that the CIR should be limited to using Tax 
Administration Act 1994 remedies, but this tact is unlikely to succeed.  
 
Finally, my view is that non-tax remedies avoid the pitfalls of tax policy and tax 
law such as found in section HK11
353
. 
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